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Grim Reapers and Grounding Finitism
Ethan Walker
Introduction
In this paper, the Grim Reaper paradox, a variant of one of Jose Benardete’s
“new-zenonian” paradoxes, will be resolved by proposing a metaphysical law that
prevents its set-up. Suppose that there is a person named Fred who is alive at
midnight. For each time 1/2n minutes a er midnight a Grim Reaper is waiting to
kill Fred if he is alive by then. So Fred is not dead at midnight, but cannot live to
any time past midnight. For this paradox to be possible, one must suppose that
some facts can be metaphysically dependent upon, or “grounded” by, infinitely
many other facts. A er describing how this assumption allows for the paradoxical
set-up to be possible, I will put forward a hypothesis about the metaphysical
structure of reality, presented as the finitist claim that some specific types of facts
can only be metaphysically dependent upon finitely many other facts. This finitist
principle resolves the Grim Reaper paradox and has no obvious counterexamples,
and thus should be adopted in the absence of any competing solutions to the
Grim Reaper paradox1.
1 Of course there are competing solutions to the paradox. Showing that the hypothesized structure presented in this




The Grim Reaper Paradox
Logical paradoxes arise when one accepts two or more plausible premises
which nonetheless lead to a logically inconsistent conclusion. Paradoxes are a
serious matter; one’s theoretical commitments should avoid inconsistency at
all cost. The Grim Reaper Paradox, originally proposed by Jose Benardete2 as
the assassin paradox, is one such logical paradox. It is also a variant of one of
Zeno’s famous paradoxes of motion. The paradox goes as follows: Fred has a
death warrant placed on him. He is alive at midnight, and is locked in a safe
sterile room with nothing that could kill him. If he lives to 12:01, Grim Reaper0
will appear in the room and kill him. However, if Fred is alive 30 seconds a er
midnight, Grim Reaper1 will kill him. Yet Grim Reaper2 awaits to kill Fred if he
lives 15 seconds past midnight. In fact, the death warrant states that for any n,
at time 1/2n minutes a er midnight there will be a Grim Reapern who will kill
Fred instantaneously. If a Grim Reaper kills Fred, then all the successive Grim
Reapers will do nothing, for Fred would already be dead.
To make the paradox more explicit, consider the following:3
Claim: Fred can only be killed by a Grim Reaper.
P1: If Fred lives 1 minute past midnight, GR0 will kill him.
P2: If Fred lives 30 seconds past midnight, GR1 will kill him
3This formulation is inspired by John Hawhtorne’s rendition of another one of Benardete’s paradoxes (John
Hawthorne, “Before-Effect and Zeno Causality”, Nous 34, (2000): 622-633).




P3: If Fred lives 15 seconds past midnight, GR2 will kill him
Pn: For any n, if Fred lives to 1/2n minutes past midnight, then Fred will not
live past 1/2n minutes, because GRn will kill him.
In order for Fred to live to 1 minute past midnight, the following
must be true:
Q0: GR0 will kill Fred
Q1: If Fred is killed by GR0, then Fred encountered GR1 and was not killed
by him.
Q2: If Fred is killed by GR1, then Fred encountered GR2 and was not killed
by him.
Qn: For any n, if Fred lives 1/2n minutes past midnight, then Fred
encountered GRn+1 at 1/2n+1 minutes past midnight and was not killed by him.
From this, one can derive Rn:
Rn: For any n, Fred cannot live 1/2n minutes past midnight.
If Rn was not true, then there would be a contradiction between Pn and Qn, and
thus Rn must be true. This is an inconsistent set of propositions. Any finite set of
Grim Reapers trying to kill Fred is consistent, as whoever the first member in that
set is will kill Fred. However, when an infinite number of Grim Reapers are
collected into a non-well ordered set, we get an inconsistency.4 From Rn and
Claim, a contradiction ensues. Assuming Fred is alive at midnight and only a Grim
4A non-well ordered set is an infinite set with at least one subset which possesses no first member. Think of it as a
set that never begins, but may have an ending (for example the set of negative integers counting down to 0). The
inconsistency here only arises if the set is non-well ordered. If the set was well-ordered, then there would be a first




Reaper can kill Fred a er midnight, then there is nothing that kills Fred, although
he cannot live past midnight, and thus he dies without a cause.5
I believe, though will not argue, that when paradoxes arise, they represent
portions of metaphysical reality’s structure being violated. The logical
inconsistency which follows comes from one or more of the premises being
impossible given the actual structure of metaphysical reality. Thus, the general
prescription for resolving paradoxes is to find the weakest premise, and reject it
via reference to metaphysical structure. In order for the Grim Reaper set-up (i.e.
having infinitely many Grim Reapers arranged in a non-well ordered set within a
finite spatiotemporal location) to be possible, it is seemingly required that some
fact (or collection of facts) of the relevant sort could be metaphysically dependent
upon infinitely many facts.6 This metaphysical dependency is what has been
called “metaphysical grounding”.7 In the next section I will explain what
metaphysical grounding is, and will show how the assumption above is required
7See Kit Fine, “Guide to Ground”, in Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality, ed. Fabrice
Correia and Benjamin Schnieder, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), and Jonathan Schaffer, “On
What Grounds What”, Metametaphysics: new essays on the foundations of ontology, ed. D.J. Chalmers, D. Manley,
and R. Wasserman, (Oxford: OUP, 2009). Grounding is thought to establish a metaphysical hierarchy.
6A qualification should be added. One could reject this claim by accepting a certain form of Jonathan Schaffer’s
priority Monism (see Jonathan Schaffer, “Monism: the Priority of the Whole”, Philosophical Review 119, (2010):
31-76). On one particular version of priority monism, the universe grounds all existing facts about concreta by the
fact that it possesses a distributional property of “tracing such-and-such a curve through physical configuration
space” (Schaffer, “Monism”: 60). I discuss this issue later on in this paper, as it poses a strong objection to my
argument (see page 20-21).
5 One can support Claim by running a subtraction argument on all other things that could possibly (nomologically
speaking) kill Fred at or before midnight. Consider the following argument:
1. There is a possible world w containing the Grim Reaper set-up and w has Fred die at or before midnight by
some cause x.
2. There is another possible world w’ where w’ is an exact duplicate of w, except w’ lacks x. 3. (conclusion)
Thus there is a possible world in which there is no x that causes Fred to be dead at or before midnight.
Assume that in w there are n many things that could kill Fred (nomologically speaking) at or before midnight. By
applying premise 2 n many times to w, we would create another possible world w’ where w’ is the exact same as




for the paradox to arise. Later on in the paper, I will provide a reason for believing
that this assumption is the weakest premise, the one to be rejected to resolve the
paradox.
Grounding the Paradox
Metaphysical grounding, or just grounding, is a constitutive relation which holds
between facts, where one fact [P]’s being “grounded” in another fact [Q] means
that [P] is constituted by [Q].8 In other words, [P] is nothing over and above [Q].
For example, the fact that there are particles arranged tablewise grounds the fact
that there is a table. There being a table is nothing over and above there being
particles arranged tablewise.9 Following Kit Fine, I take grounding, or “full
grounding”, to be a primitive notion. It is used to define the notion of partial
ground. [P] partially grounds [Q] if [P] either fully grounds [Q] or if [P] along with
some other facts fully ground [Q].
To see the difference between the two, consider the following. All of the
particles composing a table taken together fulling ground the table’s existence.
However, any one of those particles, taken in isolation or with some proper subset
of particles composing the table, only partially ground the table. They are not
enough to give us the table; something more (namely, the rest of the particles)
9Shamik Dasgupta, “Constitutive Explanation”, Philosophical Issues 27: 75-76.




must be added in for the table to exist. Grounding is also a necessity.10 If [Q]
grounds [P], then necessarily if [Q], then [P].11 Finally, grounding is a strict partial
order, meaning it is transitive (If [P] grounds [Q] and [Q] grounds [R], then [P]
grounds [R]), irreflexive (no fact [P] grounds itself), and asymmetric (if [P] grounds
[Q], then it is not the case that [Q] even partially grounds [P]).
In the Grim Reaper paradox, it is a fact that [there are infinitely many
Grim Reapers waiting to kill Fred a er midnight]. This fact is grounded in the
infinite number of facts about each Grim Reaper’s spatiotemporal (from here on
ST) location and their intentions about when they will kill Fred. Because each
Grim Reaper is a distinct entity with distinct intentions, there should be infinitely
many such facts. Further, each of the grounds for those facts should also be
distinct, for the same reasons above. Hence, each fact of the form [Grim Reapern
intends to kill Fred at 1/2n minutes a er midnight] will be grounded in distinct
facts about the position of particles and whatever other facts ground intentions.
This is the assumption of grounding infinitism:
Grounding Infinitism (GI): It is possible for some fact [F] (or
plurality of facts [FF]) to be grounded by an infinite plurality of
facts [GG].
By combining GI with a plausible theory of modal plenitude one can derive the
11 Grounding is not just a necessitation relation, however. It establishes a direction of priority. So, saying that the
existence of Socrates grounds the existence of his singleton set {Socrates} is not the same as saying Socrates
necessitates his singleton set {Socrates}. This latter claim is symmetric, for {Socrates} also necessitates Socrates,
but the former claim is not. There is a direction to grounding, but no direction to necessitation.
10
10 Alexander Skiles has put forward a couple arguments which I find rather convincing for the fact that grounds
does not always necessitate the grounded (Alexander Skiles, “Against Grounding Necessitarianism”, Erkennis,
(2015):717-751). For ease of explication, however, I shall be assuming that grounding is a necessitation relation. I





possibility of the Grim Reaper paradox.
One of the most systematic methods for answering questions about what is
possible comes from the Principle of Recombination (from here on PR).12 This
principle was created by David Lewis as a theory of plenitude from which one can
derive every logically possible world (size and shape permitting). His principle is
simply stated as follows: any duplicate d of any object x can coexist with any other
duplicate d′ of any object y, given they occupy distinct ST locations, size and shape
permitting. The size and shape permitting proviso is made so as to prevent there
from being a possible world which has more objects than could “fit together
within
some possible size and shape of spacetime”.13 I shall take Lewis’ formulation
of the PR as a satisfactory one.14
What does Lewis mean by a duplicate? One way to conceive of duplication
is that an object x is a duplicate of some object y iff x and y do not differ in their
intrinsic properties. Lewis himself says “an intrinsic property is one that can never
differ between two duplicates.”15 Lewis, however, prefers a more detailed account
of the truth conditions for two things to be duplicates: “(1) they have exactly the
same perfectly natural properties, and (2) their parts can be put into
correspondence in such a way that corresponding parts have exactly the same
perfectly natural properties, and stand in the same perfectly natural relations.”16
16 Ibid: 61.
15 Lewis, Worlds: 62.
14 George Darby and Duncan Watson offer a more precise version of the PR which evades all use of modal language.
However, that will be irrelevant for my purposes. For those interested see Darby and Watson, “Lewis’ Principle of
Recombination: Reply to Efird and Stoneham”, Dialectica 64, (2010): 435-445.
13 Ibid: 89-90.




Lewis explains perfectly natural properties by looking into the distinction
between abundant and sparse properties. For Lewis, abundant properties are
typically extrinsic properties that are arbitrarily made (either through
gerrymandering, being randomly disjunctive, etc.). These properties are not
considered to be natural properties, and having them adds nothing meaningful to
an object’s existence.17 Lewis states that there are as many abundant properties as
there are sets. On the other hand, there are sparse properties, which are rather
few in number, capable of characterizing “things completely and without
redundancy”, are intrinsic, and “carve at the joints”.18 Because of the way abundant
properties are constructed, we could say that there is an abundant property for
each of the sparse properties, and thus that the sparse properties
could be considered a small subset of the abundant properties. Lewis states that
any property belonging to the subset of sparse properties are the perfectly
natural properties. For Lewis, they are the fundamental properties that can fully
account for the essential features of our world, are intrinsic, and ground all other
properties.19 Thus for some thing x to be a duplicate of some y is for x and y to
share exactly the same perfectly natural properties.
With all of this it can now be shown that the Grim Reaper set-up is
19I say “fully account for”, however I wish to remain neutral on the question of whether properties account for things
being the way they are, or whether things being the way they are account for the properties they have. Further, I also
state that the perfectly natural properties are the “fundamental” properties. This is Lewis’ definition of
fundamentality, and is used to accurately represent his views. As will be seen later on, I present a different
formulation of what being “fundamental” means. However, this definition of “fundamental” is used with reference
to facts, whereas Lewis’ definition of fundamental is used with reference to properties. Thus it is possible for
someone to accept both definitions.
18 18 Ibid: 60. For another characterization of the perfectly natural properties, see Ted Sider, Writing the Book of the
World, (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 2011): ch.1-2. Sider defines intrinsicality in terms of perfectly natural properties.
The perfectly natural properties and relations are those that are indispensable in our best scientific theories (Sider,





possible.20 First, we must state that a single Grim Reaper is possible.
Possible Grim Reaper (PGR): There is a possible world W such that
there exists an x that is a Grim Reaper, x occupies a finite ST region
R of arbitrary size, and x has the power to kill some specific being y
within any specific finite ST interval, given that y is not already dead
by the specified ST interval.21
This definition allows for the Grim Reaper being assigned any natural number n
and being tasked with killing y within the time interval (1/2n, 1/2n-1] iff y lives to 1/2n
minutes past midnight on a specified day.
Why believe a single Grim Reaper is possible? We know that there possibly
exists a being with the intention to kill some x. We also know that there exist
beings who have the power to kill some x (we humans exert that power all the
time). Whenever some x kills some y, it always occurs within a specific time
interval. Thus we know that it is possible for some being to kill within a specific
time interval. Lastly, it is conceivable that some x intends and has the power to kill
some y at any specific time interval. While us humans cannot purposefully kill
someone at a highly specified time (such as within 1/164 of a second a er
midnight) due to human limitations, there does not seem to be any deep
metaphysical reason preventing this from being possible. Therefore it is
21This is following Laraudogoitia’s version of the Grim Reaper paradox. See Jon Peréz Laraudogoitia, “A variant of
Benardete’s Paradox,” Analysis 63, (2003): 124-131.
20 The following is inspired by Robert Koons, “Grim Reaper Kalam Argument: From Temporal and Causal Finitism
to God”, in The Kalam Cosmological Argument, vol 1.: Philosophical Arguments for the Finitude of the Past, ed.




(defeasibly) possible that there could exist a Grim Reaper as described above.
Second, we must assume that the Grim Reaper’s power to kill y is intrinsic to
the Grim Reaper, and thus perfectly natural. This way each duplicate of the Grim
Reaper will retain that power, a prerequisite if the paradox is to hold.22 Finally, it
must be made explicit what was implicit in the formulation of the PR: the
non-empty sequence of n objects that can be duplicated ranges over all the natural
numbers n.23 Thus we can apply the PR infinitely many times or to infinitely many
objects. If we accept GI, then this is possible, for the plurality of facts about each
Grim Reaper would be grounded in infinitely many facts about for instance, the
position of particles.
The argument for the possibility of the Grim Reaper Paradox is as follows:
1. Grounding infinitism is true.
2. It is possible that there exists a Grim Reaper (PGR) 3.
3. There is a possible world in which there exists infinitely
many Grim Reapers within a finite spatiotemporal
region, and who have the intention and ability to kill
some x at some time t given that x is alive at t (from 1, 2,
and Principle of Recombination).
23 This can be supported by Johsua Rasmussen’s principle of continuity (see Joshua Rasmussen, “Continuity as a
Guide to Possibility”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2014): 525-538). Here Rasmussen argues that in
general, the following “modal continuity” principle (M) holds: if any two propositions P and Q differ by a mere
quantity, then if one of the propositions is possibly true, then so is the other. Of course, this principle does not
always hold, as Rasmussen acknowledges. However, the situations in which this principle does not hold, and so
more precisification is required, are irrelevant to our purposes here.
22 Consider the following set-up: there are infinitely many Grim Reapers arranged as per the paradox, however
infinitely many of them lack the power to kill Fred. Obviously such a situation might not be paradoxical, for if every





4. Give each Grim Reaper a number n, starting with 0.
5. There is a possible world where infinitely Grim Reapers each have a distinct
number n, and the intention and ability to kill x at 1/2n minutes a er
midnight (from 3 and 4).
6. There exists a person Fred that can be killed.
7. Fred is alive at some midnight.
8. 8. There is a possible world where Fred coexists with infinitely many Grim
Reapers who each have a distinct number n, and the intention and ability to
kill him at each time 1/2n minutes a er midnight, and Fred is alive at
midnight ( 5, 6, 7).
Thus the Grim Reaper paradox is possible. However, we know that the Grim
Reaper paradox is logically inconsistent, given Claim (see page 2). Each premise is
logically consistent and independently plausible, however the conclusion is
inconsistent. Hence, one of the premises must be false.
Grounding Finitism
The Principle
By accepting GI, one allows for a possible world where infinitely many Grim
Reapers are arranged such that their intentions to kill Fred at some time t
compose a non-well ordered infinite set located within a finite ST region. I
contend that this is the most problematic premise, and should be rejected to avoid
logical inconsistency.24 First, GI is a metaphysical law, detailing
24This is following Nicholas Rescher’s “generic and uniform approach” to resolving paradoxes. He says “In




what is metaphysically possible from the structure it entails. If such a structure
leads to logical inconsistencies given otherwise plausible premises, then that
structure should be suspect. Further, there is strong intuitive support for the
possibility of there being a Grim Reaper (see above), as well as the possibility of
Claim holding (see fn. 5). The only other assumption is PR, which is by no means
an obvious truth. However, since a full defense of PR cannot be given due to lack
of space, I shall continue to assume it is true.
Because GI is required for the Grim Reaper paradox to be possible, the
cleanest route to its resolution is to accept GI’s inverse: grounding finitism. Many
people would balk at the idea of rejecting GI, for there are obvious examples of
infinitely long and infinitely wide grounding chains. Some might believe that out
of all the assumptions made for the Grim Reaper paradox (GI, PR, Claim, PGR),
GI is the most plausible, not the least. In what follows, I will discuss the examples
of infinitely long and wide grounding chains with regards to possible candidate
principles of grounding finitism, and conclude that there is a grounding finitist
principle that accommodates these grounding chains. The benefit of grounding
finitism over GI would then become apparent, because it can allow for the same
kinds of infinite grounding chains as GI, while also ruling out the Grim Reaper
paradox, unlike GI.
A first pass at Grounding Finitism is as follows:
Grounding Finitism (GF): Any fact [F] or plurality of facts [FF]
must be grounded only in a finite plurality of facts [GG].
we accept and restore consistency by making what is less plausible give way to what is more so.” [Nicholas Rescher,




This principle wholly rejects GI. On GF, it is not possible for there to be any
facts that are grounded by infinitely many facts. Hence, the fact that there are
infinitely many Grim Reapers waiting to kill Fred a er midnight cannot hold,
since it would necessarily be grounded in infinitely many facts about each Grim
Reaper. Thus we avoid the paradox.
GF is a nice principle. It is clear, succinct, but sadly, false. Consider the
following, infinitely long fact [P^(P^P)^(P^P^P)^(P^P^P^P)^...]. Such a fact exists, as it
is formed through applying the conjunction operator to the same fact infinitely
many times. So if there exists at least one fact, then there exists an infinitely long
conjunction of that fact.25Though this fact is ultimately grounded in [P], in that
each of its conjuncts will be grounded in [P], it is immediately grounded in
infinitely many facts. Every conjunctive fact is immediately grounded in each of
its conjuncts, and so this fact will be grounded in [P], [P^P], [P^P^P], [P^P^P^P],...26
Because each of these facts are distinct, this shows that GF is false. There are facts
that are grounded in infinite pluralities of facts.
Let’s then rework GF. What was shown above is that there are possible
facts that are grounded immediately in infinitely many facts. We can still get a
26 This comes from Kit Fine’s distinction between mediate and immediate grounds (see Fine, “Guide to Ground”:
50). Here he says that a fact [A] is immediately grounded by a fact [B] given that [B] need not be seen as grounding
[A] through any mediating steps. An example is the fact [AvB] is immediately grounded in [A]. A conjunctive fact
like [A^(A^B)] will be immediately grounded in each of its conjuncts, which are [A], [(A^B)]. [(A^B)] is itself
grounded in [A], [B]. Hence [B] is a mediate ground of [A^(A^B)].
25Paul Audi would disagree (See Paul Audi, “A clarification and Defense of the notion of Grounding”, in
Metaphysical Grounding: 101-121). Audi accepts what is known as a worldly conception of facts, where facts are
differentiated via their constituents and how they are combined with properties/relations. Because of this view of
facts, there is no conjunctive fact distinct from the facts which compose the conjunction or disjunction. Thus
[P^(P^P)^(P^P^P)^(P^P^P^P)^...] is no different from [P]. However, there are other facts, amenable to the worldly
conception of facts, that are grounded in infinitely many facts. This will be discussed below, when considering the





form of grounding finitism while avoiding these counterexamples as follows:
GF2: Any fact [F] or plurality of facts [FF] will be grounded only in
terminating grounding chains.
GF2 is a form of grounding foundationalism, one that was promoted by Jonathan
Schaffer.27 However, GF2, like GF, is false. Numerous authors in recent years have
proposed counterexamples to the claim that all grounding chains terminate.28 I
shall only focus on one such example, for sake of space.29 Take the following fact [x
weighs between 0 and 2 pounds]. This fact is grounded in [x weighs between 0.5
and 1.5 pounds], which is grounded in [x weighs between 0.75 pounds and 1.25
pounds], which is grounded in… All of these facts are themselves grounded in [x
weighs 1 pound], but that is besides the point. The fact [x weighs between 0 and 2
pounds] has a grounding chain that does not terminate, providing a
counterexample to GF2. Even if one could subvert such infinitely descending
grounding chains, GF2 does not prevent the paradoxical set-up. For the fact [There
are infinitely many Grim Reapers waiting to kill Fred] is not grounded in an
infinitely long chain of facts, but instead is grounded immediately in the infinity of
facts about each Grim Reaper and their intentions. Furthermore, these facts are
not grounded in an infinitely long chain of facts, but instead by facts about the
position of particles and what-not. Thus GF2 fails to do the work set-out for a
29My example comes from Dixon, “What is the Well-Foundedness”: 449-451.
28 28 See Scott T. Dixon, “What is the Well-Foundedness of Grounding?”, Mind 125, (2016): 439-468, Gabriel Oak
Rabin and Brian Rabern, “Well Founding Grounding Grounding.” Journal of philosophical logic 45, (2015):
349–379, and Jon Litland, “An Infinitely Descending Chain of Ground Without a Lower Bound.” Philosophical
studies 173, (2016): 1361–1369.




theory of grounding finitism: it fails to rule out the paradoxical set-ups.
As stated above, GF2 is a version of the well-foundedness of grounding. In
light of the above example, taken from Scott Dixon, as well as other examples not
discussed here, Dixon proposes a different theory of grounding’s
well-foundedness. To Dixon, the well-foundedness of grounding is just the
principle that “every non-fundamental fact x is fully grounded by some
fundamental facts ��.”30 A fact [P] is fundamental given that it is ungrounded, or
that nothing partially grounds [P].31 Gabriel Rabin and Brian Rabern offer a
similar definition for well-foundedness, stating that well-foundedness consists in
the world’s grounding structure having a “foundation”.32 What it means for a
grounding structure to have a foundation is for there to be a plurality of facts [GG]
such that 1.) the [GG]s are fundamental (i.e. ungrounded), and 2.) the [GG]s are
complete with regards to derivative facts in the grounding structure. 33 For the
[GG]s to be complete with regards to the derivative facts in a grounding structure
is for the [GG]s to fully ground each of the derivative facts.
While these principles don’t count as grounding finitist principles, they can
be employed as one to evade the problem above. Thus we can get the following:
GF3: Any fact [F] or plurality of facts [FF] have a finite foundation.
33Ibid.
32 Rabin and Rabern, “Well Founding Grounding Grounding”: 363.
31 31 See Schaffer, “On What Grounds What”: 373, Scott T. Dixon, “What is the Well-Foundedness”: 442, and Karen
Bennett, Making Things Up, (Oxford: OUP, 2017):104-107. One example of a fundamental fact/plurality of facts is
as follows. Say that the smallest building blocks of the universe are fundamental particles (as science understands
the term “fundamental”). The fact that there is a laptop in front of me is grounded in there being fundamental
particles that are arranged laptop-wise in front of me. This is grounded in the individual facts about the position of
the particles themselves. Those facts are fundamental. Saying these facts are fundamental, however, does not rule
out these facts having a causal history, or these particles not being causally fundamental. Surely there are facts that





We should modify this principle slightly to be more precise by adding in a
minimality clause. Thus GF3 would read “Any fact [F] or plurality of facts [FF] have
a minimal finite foundation.” A plurality of fundamental facts [GG] minimally
ground some fact [F] given that there is no proper sub-plurality of the [GG]s that
fully ground [F].34 The minimality clause is added in because it gets to the heart of
grounding finitism. Since we are concerned with a finite plurality of fundamental
facts, there will necessarily be a minimal plurality. There might not be a uniquely
minimal one, as there could be multiple distinct pluralities that minimally ground
[F] or [FF], but there will still be a minimal one. Hence the inclusion of the
minimality clause should be unobjectionable, and though not necessary, is a useful
precisification tool. We should focus on the smallest plurality (or pluralities) of
fundamental facts that fully ground some other fact [F] for simplicity’s sake.
GF3 avoids the problem of infinitely descending chains brought against GF2, since
each fact is fully grounded in [x weighs 1 pound]. It also allows for the infinitely
long conjunction [P^(P^P)^(P^P^P)^(P^P^P^P)^...], because each conjunctive fact is
grounded in the fact [P]. Through transitivity, [P] grounds
[P^(P^P)^(P^P^P)^(P^P^P^P)^...], satisfying GF3. However, GF3 is still false, for it rules
out infinitely long conjunctions containing distinct atomic facts. Suppose that
numbers exist. There will be fundamental facts about each number, say facts like
34 This definition is inspired by Karen Bennett’s definition of a minimally complete set. See Bennett, Making Things
Up: 109. While the GGs minimally ground F, they do not uniquely ground F. This is because of the possibility of
overdetermination cases. I do not see any reason to rule impossible there being some other finite plurality of
fundamental facts, HH, such that HH has at least one member not in GG, and HH fully grounds F. The HHs would
contain all and only facts relevant to the grounding of F, satisfying the minimality of grounding. See Paul Audi,




[n is the successor of n-1] where n can stand for any number. The conjunction of all
these facts will be grounded by each of these facts, and thus will have an infinite
number of fundamental grounds, in violation of GF3. Or suppose that spatial
points compose spatial regions. For each fact about a spatial region R, there will be
infinitely many fundamental facts about spatial points that ground the fact about
R.35 Thus GF3 fails to be a satisfactory grounding finitist principle.
Part of the problem with the finitist solutions proposed so far is that they
are blanket principles covering all facts. If, however, we restrict what facts our
grounding finitist principle ranges over, then we might be able to avoid these
counterexamples. Because the principles are motivated to block the Grim Reaper
paradox, it would be beneficial to look at its structure and the type of facts
employed by it. This paradox makes use of facts about Grim Reapers that exist in
a finite ST region. Thus any grounding finitist principle that is to be supported
by these paradoxes must restrict itself accordingly. We thus get two restrictions:
1.) to ST located facts, and 2.) to facts located in a finite ST region. A fact is said to
be ST located when it is about some things which exist in some ST region. For a
fact to be located in a finite ST region is just for it to be about some things that
occupy a finite ST region.
For the paradox’s set-up to be possible, all that is needed is a principle that
allows for infinitely many fundamental grounds for facts in a finite ST region. To
see this, consider that for there to be infinitely many Grim Reapers in a finite ST
location would require there to be infinitely many fundamental facts grounding
the facts about the Grim Reapers and their intentions, such as facts about the




location of particles. Thus for grounding finitism to rule out the paradoxical
set-up, all that is required is the rejection of there being infinitely many
fundamental ST located facts in a finite ST region. If grounding finitism was
expanded to include any ST region, finite or infinite, then such a principle would
be unwarranted from the “data” and hardly believable (by “data” I mean the
paradox and its structure. This is because the paradox occurs only within a finite
temporal interval. Given Minkowski spacetime, a finite temporal interval over
which events could causally interact must be a finite ST interval). Likewise if it
were to range over all facts. This inclusion would be unwarranted from the data.
With these considerations in mind, we come to a grounding finitist principle
which I think avoids obvious counterexamples and deals satisfactorily with the
Grim Reaper paradox. GF4: Any non-fundamental ST fact [F] or plurality of
non-fundamental ST facts [FF] located in a finite ST region has a minimal
finite foundation.36 From GF4, the [GG]s are minimally complete with regards
to the [FF]s.
GF4is the culmination of what the previous grounding finitist principles
did right and the lessons drawn from what they did wrong. It allows for the
existence of the conjunctive fact [P^(P^P)^(P^P^P)^(P^P^P^P)^...] because each
conjunct is grounded in [P]. Through transitivity, the conjunction is thus
grounded by [P], and so it has a finite foundation, namely [P]. GF4is also
compatible with Dixon’s infinite regress, for each of the facts [x weighs between
0 and 2 pounds], [x weighs between 0.5 and 1.5 pounds], etc. is grounded in the
36 I owe a great deal of this formulation to discussion with Rob Koons (who initially gave me the idea of grounding




single fundamental fact [x weighs 1 pound] (or whatever fundamental facts
ground the fact [x weighs 1 pound]). Finally, GF4 does not rule out the infinitely
long conjunctions of atomic facts that GF3 rules out. The conjunction of facts
about numbers is not a ST located fact, and so is out of the purview of GF4. The
case of facts about spatial regions being grounded in facts about spatial points
is likewise out of the purview of GF4, for those facts are not considered ST
located facts, per my definition. Since we are only concerned with facts about
objects existing inside of a spatial region, not the spatial regions themselves,
facts about spatial regions being grounded in infinitely many facts about spatial
points is perfectly compatible with GF4, as I’ve presented it.
The Principle in Practice
I have already mentioned before how the grounding finitist principles are
supposed to rule out the Grim Reaper paradox, but it is worth going back
through again. In the Grim Reaper paradox, it is a fact that [there are infinitely
many Grim Reapers waiting to kill Fred a er midnight]. This fact is grounded
in the infinite number of facts about each Grim Reaper’s ST location and their
intentions about when they will kill Fred. Because each Grim Reaper is a
distinct entity with distinct intentions, there should be infinitely many such
facts. Further, each of the grounds for those facts should also be distinct, for the
same reasons above. Hence, each fact of the form [Grim Reapern intends to kill
Fred at 1/2n minutes a er midnight] will be grounded in distinct facts about the




fundamental facts. Since there must be distinct facts like these for each fact
about a specific Grim Reaper, there will be infinitely many such facts. Further,
because each of the facts about the Grim Reapers will be located within the ST
region spanning from midnight to 1 minute a er midnight, there will be
infinitely many ST located facts in a finite ST region. We therefore have a
violation of GF4, and so is ruled out. It is impossible for there to be infinitely
many Grim Reapers with the intentions to kill Fred in the interval (12:00,
12:01].
Theoretical Implications
GF4 entails that if the universe is finite, then there is a minimal plurality of
fundamental facts [GG] that are complete with regards to all of the ST facts. What
is meant by this is that any ST located fact is either identical to a member of [GG]
(given that the fact is a fundamental ST located fact) or is fully grounded in [GG].
To see this, consider the plurality containing all ST located facts. Suppose, for sake
of argument, that there are infinitely many such facts. These facts would all be
located in a finite ST region, due to the universe’s finitude. However, to adhere with
GF4, such an infinitely large plurality must be accounted for by a finite plurality of
fundamental facts. Because of the minimality clause, there will be a smallest finite
set of fundamental facts that are complete with regards to the ST facts.
If one further assumes that all members of [GG] must themselves be ST




finitude of the universe.37This uniquely minimal plurality [GG] will include all and
only the fundamental ST located facts. If it did not include all of the fundamental
ST facts, then there would be some un-grounded ST located facts [HH] that are not
a part of [GG]. From GF4, the GGs are complete with regards to ST facts, and so the
[HH]s must be grounded by the [GG]s. But the [HH]s are un-grounded, and so are
not grounded by the [GG]s. This is a violation of GF4. Hence the plurality of facts
[GG] would both be finite in number and include all fundamental facts, given that
the fundamental facts must be ST located. The [GG]s will also include only the
fundamental facts, by definition in GF4. Thus in a finite universe, given GF4, and
assuming that the fundamental facts which are complete with regards to the ST
facts are themselves ST located, there will be only finitely many fundamental ST
located facts. The [GG]s will consist of all fundamental ST located facts, and since
there are only finitely many [GG]s, so too will there be only finitely many ST
located facts.
If, on the other hand, one did not assume that these fundamental facts need
to be ST located, then nothing entails that there must be a uniquely minimal
plurality. It is (epistemically) possible that there could be infinitely many distinct
pluralities of fundamental, non-ST located facts, that possess the same number of
members as [GG], and also fully ground all ST located facts.38 This is because the
[GG]s are complete only with regards to the ST facts, not all facts. The argument in
the last paragraph for the [GG]s consisting in all and only the fundamental facts
38I do not know if it is metaphysically possible that this be the case, but I see no prima facie reason to rule it out as a
possibility.
37A uniquely minimal plurality of facts that are complete with regards to the ST facts is a plurality that is not only
minimal, but is the only minimal plurality. There is no other plurality that has the same number of members as the




could not be applied here, because to do so would require the [GG]s to be
complete with regards to every fact. Without this assumption, there could be
numerous distinct pluralities of fundamental, non-ST facts that are complete with
regards to the ST facts.39
If the universe is not finite, then GF4 does not entail that there are only
finitely many fundamental facts grounding all ST located facts. There could be
infinitely many pluralities of finitely many fundamental facts that ground all of the
ST located facts within any arbitrarily large finite ST region. Or there could only
be finitely many such pluralities. GF4 leaves open either possibility given the
infinitude of the universe.
GF4 has two other theoretical implications. The first is that it entails that
material pointillism, the view that all things are composed of fundamental
material points, is false. 40 This is because if material points are fundamental, then
facts about them are fundamental facts. Thus facts about any finite object
composed by material points will be grounded in the infinity of facts about the
material points (given that composition is a form of grounding), violating GF4. The
second is that, if the general line of argument in section 3.2 is correct, then all
supertasks are ruled out by GF4. Any supertask would consist in infinitely many
distinct things trying to perform a task within a finite ST region. Thus, for the
supertask to be successful there must be infinitely many fundamental facts about
each part, facts that are located in a finite ST region. This is in violation of GF4, and
40See Rob Koons and Timothy Pickavance, The Atlas of Reality, (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2017): 390.
39Should we allow fundamental non-ST located facts to be ground ST located facts? I think so. It is possible that
God exists, and if He does exist in the traditional theistic sense (outside space and time), then any facts about Him or
His actions would necessarily be non-ST. Such facts, however, could still be said to ground ST located facts. The




so all supertasks are ruled out by GF4.
Objections
Someone might retort that they may very well accept GF4 while also accepting the
possibility of the Grim Reaper paradox. One way to do this is to state that if God
exists, then possibly He could create all of the Grim Reapers. Thus each of the facts
about the Grim Reapers would be grounded in the fact [God exists] and [God acts
in such a way as to bring it about that infinitely many Grim Reapers exist]. This
only works if one does not believe that the fact [God acts in such a way as to bring
it about that infinitely many Grim Reapers exist] is not itself grounded in an
infinite plurality of facts about God’s actions, i.e. so long as one believes the fact
[God acts in such a way as to bring it about that infinitely many Grim Reapers
exist] is fundamental. Unless one assumed that God, through one single creation
act, created infinitely many Grim Reapers, then this response fails. If God could
create infinitely many things through a single act of creation, however, then that
would provide a finite base for the infinite Grim Reapers, thus satisfying GF4. On
the other hand, if the fact [God acts in such a way as to bring it about that infinitely
many Grim Reapers exist] is grounded in infinitely many facts about God’s actions,
then we have a violation of GF4. That infinite plurality of facts would be the
fundamental grounding facts for the facts about the Grim Reapers, and hence
would violate GF4. To be honest, I do not see any good argument to support this
possibility. However I also do not see any good argument to support the possibility
that God could create infinitely many things through one action. In my opinion




generally, there is a one-to-one correspondence between creative acts and created
things than its rejection.4142
Another way of subverting the argument from GF4to the impossibility of the
Grim Reaper paradox is that given a certain type of priority Monism, GF4 and the
Grim Reaper paradox could be compossible. In his 2010 paper, Jonathan Schaffer
argues for priority Monism, the view that the cosmos is a unified whole, and is
fundamental, i.e. prior to all of its parts.43 Thus every fact about particular objects
in the universe is at least partially grounded in the universe as a whole. However,
Schaffer believes that the universe alone cannot account for the vast number of
different and diverse objects existing (the heterogeneity of the universe).44 Only
when paired with facts about the properties the universe instantiates can the
monistic cosmos fully ground all facts about its heterogeneity. Schaffer gives three
different ways one could account for heterogeneity: state that the universe
instantiates a distributional property of being heterogeneous, state that the universe
44Ibid: 59
43Jonathan Schaffer, “Monism”: 31-76.
42If one believes in Divine Simplicity, then my argument won’t work. This is because the Divine Simplicity theorist
believes that it is possible for God to create infinitely many things through a single action. Thus the fact [God exists]
could ground infinitely many ST located facts. It is also plausible that [God exists] grounds all ST-located facts, and
thus none of them are fundamental. To get around this, one may propose another grounding finitist principle, GF5:
“any fact [F] or plurality of facts [FF] that are located in a finite ST region are grounded in some finite plurality of
ST-fundamental facts [GG]”, where to be an ST-fundamental fact is to be an ST-fact not grounded in any other ST
fact. Thus, [God exists] could only ground an infinite plurality of facts [FF] located in a finite ST region given that
there is a finite plurality of ST-fundamental facts [GG] that also ground [FF]. In the Grim Reaper case,there won’t be
such a plurality. If GF4 could rule out the paradox in the case where [God exists] does not ground any ST facts, then
GF5 can likewise rule out the paradox in the case where [God exists] does ground all ST located facts. The
grounding structures in the two cases are the same, except GF5 allows God to ground all ST located facts. GF5thus
resolves the Grim Reaper paradox, and does not fall to any of the counterexamples for GF-GF3(I will leave it up to
the interested reader to see how this is so).
41Of course I would accept there to be exceptions, possible cases in which a single creative act brings about more
than one created thing (such as chemical reactions in which one combines molecules to create a new molecule, with
some byproduct. One might wonder, though, if the byproduct is truly considered to be something made through the
action, or if the action of combining the chemicals should be considered only one action. I see appeal to the thought
that what is happening is many smaller acts of creation, which are all grouped together as one act for convenience).
But allowing there to be a small number of finite exceptions does nothing to motivate the claim that there could be




instantiates regionalized properties like bearing relation R to ST location x , or state
that the universe has regionalized instantiation, where the universe
instantiates-at-ST-location-x property P.45
Of the three solutions to the heterogeneity problem, only one poses a
problem for my argument: and it’s the one Schaffer endorses. Schaffer states that
he prefers the first view, the distributional properties account of the cosmos’
heterogeneity. On this account, the infinite number of facts about each Grim
Reaper and their intentions will be grounded in only one fundamental fact: the
fact that the cosmos instantiates a distributional property such that there are
infinitely many Grim Reapers existing with the intentions they have. This satisfies
GF4 and allows the Grim Reaper set-up to be possible. However, one could avoid
this problem by instead adopting either of the two other solutions to the
heterogeneity problem. On the regionalized properties view, the facts about each
Grim Reaper and their intentions will be grounded in infinitely many fundamental
facts of the form [the cosmos instantiates the property of having Grim Reapern
existing at ST location x]. On the regionalized instantiation view, the fundamental
facts will be of the form [The cosmos is at-ST-location-x Grim Reapern-ish].
Therefore, there are viable versions of monism available to the proponent of GF4
that rule out the Grim Reaper paradox.46
46If one is not satisfied with the two options given, perhaps due to their lack of simplicity, then one could either
reject monism or modify grounding finitism even further. There are some good reasons in the literature to reject
monism. For interested readers I will point to Tuomas Tahko’s in-depth discussion of Schaffer’s argument from
quantum entanglement to the fundamentality of the universe (Tuomas Tahko, “Disentangling Nature’s Joints”, in
Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Contemporary Science, ed. William Simpson, Robert Koons, and Nicholas Teh,
(New York: Routledge, 2018): 147-166). For arguments against the “downward grounding” of the cosmos
instantiating a certain property to ground why it is a certain way, see Scott Dixon, “Upward Grounding”, Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research 97, (2018): 48-78. If one wishes instead to modify grounding finitism, then I
propose the following principle: GF6 “any fact [F] or plurality of facts [FF] that are located in a finite ST region are






In this paper I have presented the Grim Reaper paradox and shown that if one
assumes grounding infinitism, then the paradox is possible (using the Principle of
Recombination as a way of modeling possibility). I then considered four different
grounding finitist principles with the aim of blocking the paradox. Three of these
four suffered from insurmountable counterexamples, with one of them failing to
provide a way of blocking the paradox. The fourth principle, GF4 I believe
satisfactorily blocks the paradoxical set-up, evades the counterexamples to the
other three principles, and does not have any devastating objections. There aren’t
any good, independent reasons to accept GI over GF4. While there are cases of
infinite grounding that would warrant GI over other grounding finitist principles,
GF4 can accommodate those cases just as well as GI can. Further, GF4 avoids
paradoxical set-ups like the Grim Reaper paradox and other supertasks, and so has
more support that GI does. Thus, without any other competing solution to the
Grim Reaper paradox, we should accept GF4 as a metaphysical law that describes a
portion of the structure of metaphysical reality.
(this was proposed to me by Rob Koons). GF6 resolves the paradox just like GF5 does (see fn. 43), and it rules out







Neonatal Euthanasia and Morality:
What ought we to do with the sick child?
Roslyn Valdespino
Abstract
Scientific breakthroughs have greatly expanded the range in which medical
professionals can respond to patients. Although the medical field largely celebrates
these advances, some have begun to question the underlying ethics of their
implementation. In this paper, I respond to a prominent and ongoing bioethical
debate, deconstruct the arguments on both sides, and ultimately demonstrate the
moral impermissibility of the discussed practice. Specifically, I assess the ethical
considerations at play in a subtype of euthanasia: the voluntary euthanasia of
non-terminal newborns with life-altering conditions. Such a neonatal euthanasia
protocol is typically reserved for newborns who would survive infancy if treated
for their conditions, but at the cost of enduring “unbearable”, lifelong suffering as a
result. Drawing from some of the most influential perspectives in this
debate--ranging from persons with disabilities, bioethicists, philosophers, and
medical professionals--I discuss the moral inconsistencies in the implementation




unintentionally increasing marginalization among adults who are currently
affected by the same conditions which motivate this type of euthanasia in
newborns. Finally, I consider the problem of subjectivity in suffering. Aside from
reiterating that moral assessments ought to keep pace with scientific
breakthroughs, this paper concludes that any determination to terminate
extrauterine life ought not to be made by anyone other than the affected
individual. This conclusion creates room for future assessments regarding the
permissibility of euthanasia in infants, the ethics involved in physician-assisted
suicide, and the morality of other similar end-of-life cases.
Introduction
Infanticide refers to the intentional killing of a newborn or very young child.
Currently, there is ongoing debate as to whether or not there are certain contexts
that morally warrant this kind of action. In order to address this debate, I will
respond to what I believe to be one of the most compelling arguments in support
of infanticide. This argument is known as “neonatal euthanasia”, and it appeals to
the principle of beneficence. Proponents claim that infanticide is morally
permissible only when performed in this context: with the intention of sparing a
newborn from a life of unbearable pain. In such a case, it is viewed as an act of
mercy towards an extremely sick or disabled newborn.
Broadly, euthanasia refers to either an act or an omission that intentionally
brings about the death of another person for that person’s sake.47 In the context of
newborns, I shall point out that there is a difference between limiting or





withdrawing medical interventions for those with whom (an inevitable) death is
merely being delayed and doing so with newborns for whom survival is almost
otherwise guaranteed. Certain systems (such as the Dutch Groningen Protocol),
however, have been put into place specifically in order to focus on the latter
group--on those newborns who would survive if treated.48 It is the fate of this group
of newborns that will be the focus of my paper, for these are the newborns whose
predicted quality of life has been judged by others as being worse than death.
Throughout this paper, I will discuss the legalized protocol for euthanasia in
non-terminal newborns. I will discuss moral inconsistencies in its implementation,
such as the violation of nonmaleficence and the disregard for the newborn’s
potential autonomy. The societal consequences for the disabled will then be
presented. In the final portion of this paper, I discuss why a life of disease or
disability is not one that should be judged by others as worse than and in need of
death. Moreover, based on these assessments, I will conclude that the arguments in
support of a neonatal euthanasia protocol for non-terminal newborns remain
unconvincing. Thus, the implementation of such a protocol cannot be morally
permissible. These newborns ought to be treated to survive.
Duties towards the Patient
The common phrase, “Do no harm,” highlights the principle of nonmaleficence in
medicine. In order to uphold this standard, medical professionals must not
intentionally or unintentionally inflict harm upon others. To do so would violate
this key moral issue, and it would compromise the trust patients have in their
48 Verhagen, Eduard, and Sauer, Pieter J.J. “The Groningen Protocol — Euthanasia in Severely Ill Newborns.” The




physicians.49 By employing a policy of neonatal euthanasia, physicians bring about
the ultimate harm to their patients. Additionally, parents of ill or disabled
newborns may grow skeptical of their physician’s motives.
Also pressing, in this case, is compliance with the moral principle of
autonomy. As defined by Lewis Vaughan, autonomy is “a person’s rational capacity
for self-governance or self-determination; [it is] the ability to direct one’s own life
and choose for oneself”.50 When, as in the case of infants, the patient is not capable
of expressing his preference for certain treatments, these choices fall to surrogate
decision-makers. O en, these surrogates are close family members. One important
caveat, however, is that these surrogates are close; they ought to know the patient
well enough to make a decision based on what they believe the patient would have
wanted. Their decisions aren’t expressions of their own desires but are expressions
of what they believe the patient would have desired. You would not want your
long-estranged father to make a life or death medical decision for you if the last
time you saw him was when he walked out on you when you were five. Likewise, it
seems problematic that parents who have not yet gotten to know the personality of
their newborn should be allowed to subject the newborn to a life-ending protocol.
These parents have no way of knowing what decision their newborn would prefer
if he was capable of expressing his opinion. Moreover, because people
systematically misjudge how bad it would be to have a disability,51 I shall argue that
51 Leplège, Alain, and Hunt, Sonia. “The Problem of Quality of Life in Medicine.” JAMA : the Journal of the
American Medical Association, vol. 278, no. 1, 1997, pp. 47–50.
50 Vaughn, Lewis. Bioethics : Principles, Issues, and Cases. Fourth ed., Oxford University Press, 2020.
49 Gaylin, Willard, et al. “Doctors Must Not Kill.” JAMA : the Journal of the American Medical Association, vol.




it is not ethically permissible to rely on surrogate decision-makers who will
predictably misjudge the quality of life of those with disabilities.
I admit that it is possible to use this argument in reverse. For example, why
treat newborns at all? Surely, newborns are incapable of implementing their
autonomy and cannot consent to any forms of treatment;52 so, why assume that
they would want to be treated? However, this reversal to me seems unconvincing.
When a rational adult patient is unable to provide consent (and when no surrogates
are available to provide consent on his behalf), the default in medical practice is to
treat his condition and prolong life.53 I argue that this default also exists when the
patient is a newborn. Surely, the moral status that newborns possess is reason
enough to justify prolonging life until the patient is able to request otherwise. As
Alexander Kon states, we ought to provide these non-terminal patients with the
best possible medical care until they are capable of expressing their own
decisions.54
Healthcare providers ought to work diligently to minimize the newborn’s
suffering. As he grows older, he will be better equipped to understand his condition
and to compare its burdens against the joys in his life. Only he, upon reaching the
age that confers upon him the legal authority to consent, may make the
determination that his suffering is truly unbearable and that he would be better if
allowed to die. However, he must be of a rational decision-making capacity and
must not be experiencing psychological illnesses (such as depression) which might
54 Kon, Alexander A. “We Cannot Accurately Predict the Extent of an Infant's Future Suffering: The Groningen
Protocol Is Too Dangerous to Support.” The American Journal of Bioethics, vol. 8, no. 11, 2008, pp. 27–29.
53 Cooksley, Tim, et al. “A Systematic Approach to the Unconscious Patient.” Clinical Medicine (London, England),
vol. 18, no. 1, Royal College of Physicians, 2018, pp. 88–92, doi:10.7861/clinmedicine.18-1-88.





cloud his decision. As Kon pointed out, if the illness or disability prevents the
neurocognitive functioning needed in order to accurately evaluate one’s own level
of suffering, then it remains impermissible to terminate this person’s life.
Therefore, requests for physician-assisted suicide motivated directly by mental
illnesses which impact this functioning ought to be denied--as rational
decision-making capacities are altered.
Harmful Societal Implications and Increased
Marginalization
An acceptance of neonatal euthanasia as an act of mercy signifies a belief that
certain lives are worse than death. It reflects an acceptance that certain conditions
bring about so much hardship and suffering that all future joys in life are not
capable of outweighing this suffering. However, I am skeptical that the value of a
life should be determined by extrinsic factors such as health and productivity. I
argue that we must not only recognize the intrinsic value of individual life, but we
must also protect vulnerable newborns so as to avoid setting a precedent about
what forms of life we judge as worth living. For, if it is acceptable to euthanize
infants for a given condition, then it would logically follow that adults with the
same conditions might feel societal pressures to pursue the same fate.
In the face of extensive medical bills, frequent hospital visits, and poorly
managed pain, this pressure could build to a point such that disabled people may
begin to view euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide as the only treatments le 
which grant them some form of dignity. It is possible that disabled people may be




as to achieve what society views as a “death with dignity”. 55 In such a way,
handicapped people are at increased risk of facing the unspoken (but deeply felt)
duty to die, and it truly might seem to them more of a duty than a choice.56 Thus,
acceptance of a neonatal euthanasia protocol places already vulnerable adult
populations at increased risk for harm and susceptibility to coercion for treatments
they may not truly want.
This potentially felt “duty to die” is harmful for several reasons. First, it
reinforces an already unjustified double standard for patients who usually just want
to escape from the pain of their current condition. For example, when a
40-year-old businesswoman requests voluntary active euthanasia because she feels
isolated from her peers and feels as though she cannot contribute meaningfully to
her work, support and prevention tools are provided to her in response. It is seen
as a very tragic situation that ought to be worked through without resulting in the
termination of her life. However, Liz Carr points out that if a disabled woman in an
otherwise identical situation were to request to end her life, her decision would not
only be supported, but it would be seen as rational and understandable!57 The
disabled woman is rarely offered the same treatment for depression or provided
other prevention tools; rather, her decision is seen as final. This negative societal
view of life with handicaps will only be reinforced if we accept euthanasia in
infants with these conditions.
57 Liz Carr, “Legalizing Assisted Dying is Dangerous for Disabled People,” The Guardian, September 9, 2016.
56 Davis, Alison. “A Disabled Person's Perspective on Euthanasia.” Disability Studies Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 3,
2004.





Additionally, the implementation of a neonatal euthanasia protocol risks the
development of increasingly negative views towards those newborns who “survive”
the protocol. As more infants with certain conditions intentionally do not survive
due to neonatal euthanasia, all other persons living with those conditions will come
to be viewed callously; they will come to be viewed as mistakes within a system that
was designed to prevent their survival. Misunderstanding and discrimination are
likely to increase as the number of people with a given disability decreases.
Moreover, it is possible that these views will lead to a less supportive environment
for those living with these handicaps. In fact, initiatives for research may decline,
funds for facilities to care for these individuals may decrease, and attitudes of
medical personnel towards these patients at the end of their lives may become
overbearingly paternalistic.
The Problem of Subjectivity
While in theory, it might follow that euthanasia can function as a mercy to
newborns, in practice, there are too many dangers that cannot be presently
accounted for. For example, the notion of implementing neonatal euthanasia based
on “unbearable suffering” is inherently flawed and prone to mistakes. The
“unbearable suffering” is an estimate of the sum of both the physical and mental
pain that the newborn is predicted to experience if treated for his condition and
permitted to survive. It is a determination that there will never be enough joys
present in the newborn’s life to ever outweigh the suffering he will experience




But, how can medical personnel knowingly bring about the death of an
infant based on the subjective experience of the infant himself--based on something
that cannot be expressed to them at the time at which the protocol is
implemented? Additionally, what one individual might deem unbearable suffering,
another might be capable of enduring. So, although medical care providers and
parents believe they are acting in the newborn’s best interest if they spare the
newborn from experiencing such a life,58 In reality, they merely risk killing
newborns who would grow to determine that their suffering does not actually
outweigh the joys in their lives.
Clearly, the consequences of such a protocol demonstrate that those with
disabilities will be placed at increased risk for even further marginalization. In fact,
studies have demonstrated that a physician’s evaluation regarding the quality of life
experienced by a disabled person o en ranks it much lower than the disabled
person himself ranks it.59 It is possible that physicians, who o en do not themselves
suffer from such disabilities, attempt to estimate their impact on quality of life by
imagining how they would feel if suddenly shi ed from an able-bodied life to one
tackling disability. Yet, in doing so, they factor in the devastation of losing certain
abilities which they have assumed are guaranteed, and they must then imagine a
world in which they must adapt to the new and permanent loss. However, this is
surely not the situation experienced by newborns who come into this world
already disabled. These newborns know nothing of their loss in the sense that they
59 Leplège, Alain, and Hunt, Sonia. “The Problem of Quality of Life in Medicine.” JAMA : the Journal of the
American Medical Association, vol. 278, no. 1, 1997, pp. 47–50.





never experienced life without their disability. O en, in fact, children born with
disabilities rate their quality of life on par with their non-disabled counterparts.60
Here, I ought to address a distinction which I believe is critical to this debate.
Proponents of this protocol argue that it spares the newborn from a life of
otherwise unbearable suffering. Yet, I want to make a distinction between suffering
and suffering unbearably. It is quite clear to me that any infant whose conditions are
grim enough to warrant consideration for euthanasia must surely be suffering. Yet,
it is not clear to me if the infant’s suffering has reached such a point that it has
become unbearable for him. Thus, neonatal euthanasia risks condemning to death
newborns whose suffering would have turned out not to be unbearable for
them--newborns who would have judged their quality of life as satisfactory and
indeed worth living. This is an assessment that can only be made later in life by the
newborn himself. So, by subjecting newborns to neonatal euthanasia, physicians
risk doing the ultimate harm to their patients; they risk potentially depriving them
of a life that may have been judged as worth living.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have provided an account that addresses critical components of the
infanticide debate in the context of the non-terminal infant. I have demonstrated
why infanticide cannot be viewed as a form of beneficence to the sick newborn,
and I have assessed the risks this protocol poses (both to the individuals subjected
to it and to the larger population of handicapped persons). Moreover, I have
emphasized the existence of a gradient of severity that is present in a newborn’s
60 Tyson, Jon E, and Saigal, Saroj. “Outcomes for Extremely Low-Birth-Weight Infants: Disappointing News.”




suffering, and I have discussed the problem of subjectivity. Based on these
assessments, I have concluded that the neonatal euthanasia protocol for
non-terminal newborns is too ethically dubious for the medical community to
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I do not want to die—no; I neither want to die nor do I want to want to die; I want to live
for ever and ever and ever. I want this “I” to live—this poor “I” that I am and that I feel
myself to be here and now, and therefore the problem of the duration of my soul, of my own
soul, tortures me. 
—Miguel De Unamuno 
The Tragic Sense of Life, 1912
All my life coldly and sadly the days have gone by.
 I who dreamed wildly and madly am happy to die…. 
Long since my heart has been breaking its pain is past. 
A time has been set to its aching peace comes at last.
 
—Lawrence Macdonald 
Monument to Emily Georgiana, Lady Winchilsea,
1850
Abstract
This essay analyzes the existential contours of being and death. Deploying a
thought experiment which outlines the hypothetical conditions of ‘true
immortality’, I utilize a vast literature on the topics of death, existentialism, and
freedom to disambiguate the existences of human beings and true immortals. I
explore the ways that dying and death define our conditions of being and
instantiates a humanness that is fundamentally different to true immortals who are
impervious to death. I contend that the metaphysical condition of death, which is




phenomenologically, temporally, and otherwise ontologically that, as a result,
constitute a different creature than what I define as a true immortal. On one hand, I
list and elaborate on numerous features of the human condition that I assert
imbues human beings with a particular humanness. In contrast, I describe two
conceptual assertions about the existential strictures of true immortality that
underwrite their mode of being. This essay attempts to explicate the relationship
between death and existence and, in the process, theorize about how the
fundamental nature of human beings is ontologically defined by the capacity for
and inevitability of death.
Introduction
The relationship one has to their death is, all the time, an existential
contemplation. It can be said, then, that our relationship to immortality and its
potential is an existential impasse. To be clear, I want to prime this dialectic by
offering the necessary distinction between the two forms of immortality. Belief in
the feasible potential of immortality is not necessary to conceive of the conditions
of both medical or true immortality. The former can be succinctly defined as the
invulnerability to death due to natural causes of any sort. What is more or less an
ode to Victor Frankenstein’s aspiration to “banish disease from the human frame
and render man invulnerable to any but a violent death!”61 The alternate kind of
immortality, which is the physiological and existential framework within which
this work will operate, is what is referred to as “true immortality”. While Victor
wished to bypass the physiological essentiality of decay and natural death, true




immortality is the condition whereby the individual is invulnerable, as it
were, incapable of death altogether. The question is o en asked of what one may
gain under the condition of immortality and the answers appear obvious: infinite
projects, the alleviation of dread concerning death, the intrinsic goodness of life’s
continuation, etc. However, I want to probe more deeply into a profoundly
different question: what does one stand to lose under the conditions of true
immortality? 
There are numerous points of divergence when discussing the constitutions of
the person who is truly immortal and the person who is a human being.
Additionally, much can be said with respect to the impact that these vastly distinct
physiological constitutions can and will have throughout the course of their
respective lives. A great many of these consequences are existential in nature. That
is, they pertain to the topic of human freedom and its mutual relation to the
conditions of our existence. What is more, I explore how consequences put into
question differences between human and true immortal consciousness to the
freedom or lack thereof of the conditions of birth and fate of our life and death.
What is also imperative is the ontological relations that human beings have toward
their death. Using Heideggerian guideposts, I analyze the immanence and
eminence of death as the foremost condition of being in human life, cra ing a
nexus of significance and relation between what is means to be human, how the
potential for death impacts this meaning and what it entails to be conscious of this
relational impact. This ontological relation is relevant as well to the dimensions of
meaning and boredom, projects and memory in the disambiguation of temporal




who, taking on similar projects, is easily capable of exhausting meaning in their
actions and becoming susceptible to boredom and meaninglessness. Lastly, I
attempt to reverse the deprivation account by suggesting that enterally immortal
existence deprives the individual of the option to die if they so choose and purloins
the option for one not to exist a er death, further assorting the existential journeys
of these two creatures qua their physiological constitutions. I want to examine and
explicate the piercing existential dangers posed to human beings under the
conditions of true immortality. That is, the aim of this paper is to elucidate the
myriad ways that one’s modes of being are transmuted under the conditions of
true immortality. It is my contention that the potential for and eventuality of death
underwrites the particularities the human quintessence, that true immortality
is existentially transformative and diminutive. 
It is not enough to ascertain true immortality in the simplified fashion outlined
above. Nor should we concede the notion that immortality, especially in the ‘true’
sense, can be qualified as a condition of human life or, at the very least, an extension
of human life. The position of true immortality must, in my view, confront its
differences with the deeply enshrined aspects of the human condition which, in
many ways, it obliterates. In simpler words, one reaches the conclusion that true
immortality indefeasibly alters the fundamental nature of humanness. True
immortality creates a fundamentally different creature to that of human beings.
Therefore, in this essay, I distinguish between the two animals who I believe are
existentially and metaphysically opposed: human beings and true immortals. 
J.M. Fischer lays out three requirements within the conceptual framework of




human, the imagined immortal must be me, and finally, the immortal life must be
attractive.62 Note the first two requirements for desirability are principally
existential; they stipulate the preservation of a fixed human nature which I argue is
irremediably changed given the true immortality condition. Moreover, measuring
attractiveness entails strong subjective value judgments of immortal quality of life
which again hinges on existential qualities that I elaborate on throughout the work.
Each conceptual facet of the true immortality condition will undoubtedly alter the
hypothetical mode of being for that truly immortal creature, as well as its
respective degrees of attractiveness. I devise a thought experiment in which I lay
out the facets of true immortality, framing its conditions and scope. From a purely
conceptual perspective, a couple assertions can be made in respect to the
constitution of the true immortal. That is, 1) true immortality makes being a
contingency in itself and 2) the temporal relation to death and its contingent
dynamism of action is permanently lost. In other words, true immortality forces
one to exist for its own sake, for eternity. Also, the way human beings approach
death phenomenologically and otherwise as a necessity of the future is no longer
possible and thus, all action which depends on this temporal relation is demeaned.
These assertions scaffold the material reality of life which distinguish true
immortals from human beings. Furthermore, they delineate the metaphysical
conditions which existentially constrain the true immortal, once again marking its
difference from humanness. 
62 Fischer, John, Martin. Fundamentals of Philosophy Series: Death, Immortality, and Meaning in Life. (Oxford:




According to Fischer, in order for a thing to maintain its identity it must exist
within its particular metaphysical parameters. While an object may accommodate
certain superficial changes, it must adhere to the material structures that make it
what it is or else it is no longer that thing.63 There are many features of life that I
argue are constitutive of its humanness, of which I would include, among other
things, freedom, authenticity, potential, meaning, physiological decay, and death.
Correspondingly, the features I attribute to true immortality—through a
continuous heap of counterfactuals—is defined in full (for dialectical purposes) in
this hypothetical experiment: 
Imagine an existence where you are born a true immortal. That is, you are
completely invulnerable to death by any means, irrespective of the cause or
force. You simply cannot ever die, and thus you would be subject, without
recourse, to everlasting life on Earth. Your body will not be recreated or
otherwise reincarnated in any form except that as you were born and
have grown into. Barring any cataclysmic event or series of events that ravages
our planet, you can still be made to live an abundant life without fear that it
will be taken from you or altered in any physiological way. Moreover, despite
the typical inevitability of decay, senescence, and its associated sufferings, you
are immune to ageing and will maintain your youthful vigor forever (assume
an age cut-off point of say a 25-year-old). Thus, you are able to fulfill all your
desired projects for an infinitely long time. As an added benefit, let us suppose
that all individuals, including your loved family and friends live under this
condition of true immortality as well. Being all at once the charm and caveat
of this existence, you are impervious to death, and so, can never commit
suicide. You are bound to life and living, without choice, forever. 
I have established the metaphysical parameters or rather the borders which
constitute the life of a true immortal. Amenable as these conditions may seem,
there are still challenges that arise with this way of living that run counter to our
fundamental humanness. True immortality absolves human freedom in its most
obvious stricture, being the freedom of choice between life or death as it




definitionally precludes the latter. Our cultivation of meaning, including the
meaning of our own lives, and its robustness therea er is directly related to the
temporal, as it were, finite nature of the entities we ascribe value judgements to.
The diminution of meaning and temporality also provokes the question of
boredom within true immortal life. Perhaps counterintuitively, I want to make the
claim for the value of death as a plausible human desire of the first and second
order and as a necessary ontic potentiality and then reverse the deprivation claim,
straddling it to the desirability of death in an otherwise truly immortal world. 
Death and Freedom 
One can maintain the intrinsic value of life with little trouble, and therea er assert
the goodness of continued life without limitation, which is the immutable condition
of true immortality. Returning to Fischer, the metaphysical and existential
parameters of a thing must be upheld for it to maintain a particular identity. Leon
Kass64 agrees with my position that “to argue that human life would be better
without death is…to argue that human life would be better being something other
than human.”65 Citing Kurzweil, Felicia Ackerman rebuts this notion by begging the
question of why we ought to define humans in respect to their limitations (death
being our ultimate delimitation) as opposed to defining humanity by its ability to
transcend those limitations.66 Although Kurzweil views death as the condition
which delimits human capacity par excellence, a larger constrain is cast upon the
66 Ackerman, Felicia, Nimue. Death is a Punch in the Jaw: Life Extension and its Discontents. The Oxford Handbook
of Bioethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
65 Ibid, pg. 265





true immortal that itself delimits the creature who is bound to living without
recourse. True immortals differ from human beings insofar as their agentive
capacity to choose between life and death is unviable; a true immortal cannot
choose death as he is impervious to it. To be clear, the freedom of will towards
death and dying is not altogether lost in the true immortal world. One assumes the
capacity for decay and annihilation for all other biological organisms except for
true immortal people. However, the condition of true immortals does not exclude
the potential of what Frankfurt delineates as first and second-order desires. First
order desires being ones where we desire to do or not to do or be or not to be
something. The latter are desires to want to do something or desires to have
particular desires.67 In his tract, The Transcendence of the Ego, Jean-Paul Sartre
emphasizes the procurement of objects of desire by the conscious me. According to
Sartre, the me “if it is not present to consciousness, is hidden behind consciousness
and is the magnetic pole of all our representations and all our desires”68 The
phenomenological capacity for death and the desire it fosters belies the reality of a
true immortal whose freedom to determine their fate is never offered to him. 
Freedom is one of many essential parameters of humanness that I asserted
cannot be altered or subjugated while still insisting on its particular human
constitution. Many immortality optimists are persistent in transcending human
limitations while neglecting the fact that true immortality is itself a limit. While I
do not deny that life has intrinsic value, irrespective of the perceived beneficence
68 Sartre, Jean-Paul. The Transcendence of the Ego. (New York City: Hill and Wang, 1957), pg. 55
67 Frankfurt, Harry G. "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person." The Journal of Philosophy 68, no. 1




of life and living, this profit ought not to subsume the irrevocable human value of
freedom of choice. In his proto-existential novel, Notes from
Underground, Dostoevsky uses numerous phrases that analogize the misguided
notions of human rationality and beneficence undergirding the utopian ideal and
which I import to illuminate the limitations and follies of true immortality. Alas,
literature is wed to philosophy through metaphor. Dostoevsky uses phrases such as
the ‘laws of human nature and arithmetic’, ‘real profit’, and ‘virtuous wanting’ in
order to burlesque the paternalistic and utilitarian nature of human rationality
which seek to undermine personal agency. Dostoevsky wanted to discard the virtue
of human rationality and benefit precisely because it has the potential to negate
desire and thus negate freedom. The protagonist writes, “And where did all these
sages get the idea that man needs some normal, some virtuous wanting? What
made them necessarily imagine that what man needs is necessarily a reasonably
profitable wanting? Man needs only independent wanting”69 He continues by
declaring that: 
reason…is a fine thing…but reason is only reason and satisfies only man’s
reasoning capacity, while wanting is a manifestation of the whole of life….there
is only one case… when man may purposely, consciously wish for himself even
the harmful, the stupid, even the stupidest of all: namely so as to have the
right to wish for himself even what is stupidest of all and not be bound by an
obligation to wish for himself only what is intelligent. For this stupidest of all,
this caprice of ours…may in fact be the most profitable of anything on earth
for our sort….70
For my part, the object of living without recourse to any choice regarding its
continuation or cessation, especially in light of the phenomenological capacity for
death, is a deeply inferior metaphysical condition. It is important to note the
70 Ibid, pg. 28
69 Dostoevsky, Fyodor. Notes from Underground (Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky Trans.). (New York City:




distinctions between an agent’s will to freedom to act and their will to act. For it can
be perfectly normal for an agent to be deprived of their freedom to act whilst
leaving their freedom of will and desires intact, as would imaginably be the case for
the true immortal.71 Clearly the irremediable nature of the truly immortal
condition does not necessarily occlude the potential for one’s effective desires or
their will and, in this way, a phenomenological similarity is found between the
human being and their true immortal counterpart. It does, however, offend the
freedom of action (with respect to the capacity for death) in the true immortal
where it does no such thing for the human being who can and eventually will die.
Thus, I assert the existential tyranny of true immortality. I can agree in good faith
that life is valuable a priori and still conclude, as Dostoevsky had, that within the
hierarchy of human values, freedom outstrips the beneficent, specifically that
which is thrust upon us. As Berlin once remarked, “To block man from every door
but one, no matter how noble the prospect upon which it opens, or how
benevolent the motives of those who arrange this, is to sin against the truth that he
is a man, a being with a life of his own to live.”72 That freedom dwells within the
upper bound of human values, and that its lack is of tragic consequence is not to
suggest that it is the only major shortcoming of true immortality.
Complications abound when considering true immortality and its
constraining forces. These complications have to do with the quality of life at hand.
Although the hypothetical experiment I provided ensured the absence of senility
and the suffering that typically accompanies ageing, to imagine even a youthful,
72 Berlin, Isaiah. ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, in Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (New York: Oxford University Press),
1969. 118-72. Pg. 127.




truly immortal world without certain implications of suffering would be to engage
in continuous flights of fancy. We can imagine a world where individuals are born,
do not and cannot experience disease and only age to a certain extent and then no
more a erward. However, as Benatar notes, death is only one bad thing that can
befall one. Other negative experiences can occur to individuals throughout their
life, regardless of age or bodily fitness.73 Many of these experiences can persist
throughout one’s life as well. The physiological conditions of a true immortal have
very little bearing on severe social and economic inequality, poverty, various
ineptitudes, personal failures, heartbreak, and other suffering that may befall an
individual during the course of their life. In fact, one can easily imagine that a true
immortal, compared to a finite human being, would endure protracted suffering.
Eternal life would surely entail perpetual suffering. The difference is one of these
beings will have put a stop to their suffering a er the occurrence of death; the
other will not. Benatar suggests that to make immortal life a desirable one, we
would have to stipulate that immortal life be blissful or that one could opt out of
immortality if they so wished.74 This choice to opt out of immortality is plausible
in the realm of medical immortality where one is capable of dying by violent
causes and could, conceivably, undertake suicide thereby ending their life. The true
immortal is utterly bere  of this choice ideal. It is true that human beings are not
in control of much of the suffering that they endure under the influence of many
unjust social structures and other individuals close or not close to them. Human
74 Ibid, pg. 153




beings, however, do have the choice, under any circumstance, to cease living when
they want, and at any rate, would have ceased living at some point. 
Notwithstanding the qualities that make human beings and true immortals
fundamentally different beings, they clearly share certain commonalities. One such
commonality between both human beings and true immortals, and in fact all living
things, is their lack of control over the actions that resulted in them being brought
into existence. Both creatures o en have no control over the actions that cause
suffering in their respective existences. What is more, neither creature is ever in
control of the only actions that could have obviated their suffering altogether, those
actions which put into motion their existence.75 Essentially all creatures are
arbitrarily thrown into existence. True immortality presents a metaphysical
tyranny which bears importance on the symmetry of being and non-being.
Lucretius was an Epicurean poet and philosopher who put forth a mirror argument
to illustrate that prenatal and postmortem nonexistence are identical: 
Look back again to see how the unending expanse of past time, before we are
born, has been nothing to us. For Nature holds this forth to us in a mirror
image of the time to come a er our death. Is there anything terrible there,
does it seem gloomy? is it not more peaceful than any sleep?76
In part a consolation to the human dread of death, and in part a response to the
popular deprivation account, Lucretius argues that both modes of nonexistence are
temporally and metaphysically similar and therefore, if one is indifferent to their
nonexistence before they were born, so too should they be indifferent to their
nonexistence a er they die.77 In simpler terms, prenatal and postmortem
77 Ibid Fischer, pg. 41





nonexistence are symmetrical. The importance of illustrating the symmetry
argument is to demonstrate that true immortality itself offers a symmetry, albeit
an oppressive one. Just like the symmetry argument presented by Lucretius
regarding our prenatal and postmortem nonexistence, the true immortality
condition proffers a metaphysical symmetry of prenatal and immortal
non-control. No one is ever in control of the circumstances culminating in their
conception and eventual birth. Only their biological parents hold such a privilege.
Correspondingly, a truly immortal life robs one of their agency concerning death
as it definitionally precludes death. One cannot control their birth any more than
they can control the death they are incapable of having. Furthermore, the infinite
and oblivious temporal lapse before their birth congruently corresponds to the
infinite, meandering lifespan of the true immortal a er they are born. If the mirror
argument says we are to be indifferent as to our death because we are no longer
living, that is because we no longer have a conscious I or me to intend or desire
anything worth concern or apathy. That consciousness, like everything else, is
simply annihilated upon death. It is easily imaginable that the true immortal’s
imperviousness to death complicates second-order desires for death and dying,
albeit in the same way the condition of death does for human beings yearning for
immortality as demonstrated in the first of this paper’s two epigraphs. Admittedly,
the distinct complications we see regarding the second-order desires and freedom
of wills between these two creatures and their fates, while not exactly equating to
two phenomenologically differentiated positions, still underscore a difference in
kind between these desires and wills precisely because of their physiological




cognizant of death, help but to intend death. An awareness which it cannot act
upon. Human beings need never confront this block. In fact, the temporal journey
of their existence negates this block. 
Human beings partake in three successive metaphysical stages of prenatal
nonexistence, existence, and finally, postmortem nonexistence. Invariably,
existence is what unites these stages of nonexistence and what I believe is
constitutive of a life imbued with humanness. This tripartite unity requires death.
True immortals, on the other hand, have a unity of a different sort. The problem is
that true immortality affords one perfect symmetry; it affords a dichotomous unity.
This is undesirable because it is invariably a symmetry of metaphysical tyranny;
one which they do not and cannot choose on either end. Invulnerability to death
would permanently alter the human tripartite unity. It bisects it. It mutates it.
Moreover, it is an asymmetrical existential tyranny because free will necessitates a
consciousness to apprehend it and act upon it, no such capacity exists before birth.
Yet, this phenomenological capacity exists for both creatures, only one, however,
can truly anticipate it and be towards it forever. Freedom, is then, in the most
impactful sense, a human characteristic. Freedom and death are existential
qualities that are allocated differently according to the metaphysical constitutions
of different creatures. 
Being-Toward-Death as a Potentiality
Being in the world is fundamentally shaped by our tendency, as it were, our
capacity to question our very mode of being. The German philosopher Martin




which being is a question. We attend to this question as a means to ascertain our
existence and truthfully exist in the world. Heidegger termed this Being as Dasein.
The former of the two assertions outlined earlier which I stated were constitutive
of true immortals: true immortality makes being a contingency in itself, is helpful
in demarcating the essential features of Dasein or human beings in general.
Without explicitly referring to the parameters of Dasein as borders, such as Fischer
does, Heidegger professes that death is a potentiality of Dasein and could thus be
presently attributable to Dasein as a “not-yet” feature. The two following
quotations will be useful to elucidate Heidegger’s conception of
being-toward-death. He writes that “it is a matter of taking the existential meaning
of the coming-to-an-end of Dasein itself and of showing how this “ending” can
constitute a being whole of the being that exists”78 Also: 
just as Dasein constantly already is its not-yet as long as it is, it also always
already is its end. The ending that we have in view when we speak of death,
does not signify a being-at-an-end of Dasein, but rather a being toward the
end [Sein zum Ėnde] of this being. Death is a way to be that Dasein takes over as
soon as it is.79
That true immortality makes being a contingency in itself, belies the essential fact
that Dasein is partly constituted by its very potential for death. According to
Heidegger, to characterize being-toward-death was to understand this
being-toward this not-yet as a distinct possibility or potential of Dasein.80 Indeed,
he referred to death as Dasein’s “ownmost, nonrelational, and insuperable
[unüberholbar] possibility.”81 (which one could not escape. Consistent throughout the
81 Ibid, pg. 241
80 Ibid, pg. 250
79 Ibid, pg. 236
78 Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time (J. Stambaugh Trans.). (Albany: State University of New




suggestions of Heidegger and Kass, it appears death is the shape of life, at least of
that relating to human life. 
Admittedly, one may find it difficult to decipher, or for that matter, grasp the
significance of the ontological premise of death that Heidegger binds so tightly to
Dasein. Coyne says, so the theory runs, that life has no “end” if this end is to be
understood as the culmination of a point of magnitude. Rather, he claims that the
intrinsic existential value of death is that it is tied to the permeation of death as a
possibility of Dasein82. In other words, Dasein has a perpetual, acute sense of death
as a possibility that punctuates its own ending. Death being the most imminent
possibility of being no less, and Heidegger suggests as much. As part of a series of
potentialities which human beings alone can represent and project, death is a
possibility of the highest magnitude precisely because it extends farther than all
other possibilities. What is more, compared to all other possibilities, death and its
finite temporal structuring which it thrusts upon Dasein, informs, to the greatest
degree, all other existential constituents of Dasein itself. In addition, if death, as
Heidegger suggests, is a way of being that Dasein procures the moment that it is,
then death is the most possible and urgent of possibilities.83 The shadow of death
becomes of Dasein, its all-encompassing possibility and influence. For better or
worse, death provides the raison d’être of Dasein. If I am to say that death
constitutes the human aspect as surely as it veils our existence and because of our
acuity to it, I may concede that the potentialities of true immortals overlap with
human beings except for in its most fundamental region of being. I can suggest
83 Ibid.





with confidence that the ownmost, insuperable potentiality of the true immortal is
indeed a very impossibility, that of dying and death.
Like Heidegger, Seneca warned us to be vigilant when, crippled with anxiety,
we chose to lament over life’s brevity and death. He urged us to cast our eyes on
death at all moments.84 This acuity of life’s evanescence which Seneca encouraged
in us arose, undoubtedly, from an acuity of the inevitability that one would
eventually meet their demise. Anxiety, Heidegger tells us, is actually a way of
existing in the world. He made it clear that anxiety ought not to be confused with
fear over death but rather a cogent perception or ‘disclosedness” of a reality forged
by death as Dasein’s greatest possibility.85 As well as Heidegger, both Camus and
Sartre emphasized the instrumentality of consciousness in being. Camus declared
that “the consciousness of death is the call of anxiety…one stands in this absurd
world and points out its ephemeral character. He seeks his way amid the ruins.”86
Camus encodes within his philosophy a more plausible encouragement, that of
rebellion against the absurd, embattled condition of life. Less realistic in terms of
his prescriptions but more exigent is Heidegger, who believed “that understanding
does not primarily mean staring at a meaning, but understanding oneself in the
potentiality-of-being that reveals itself in the project”87 This conscious relation to
death or ‘anticipation [Vorlaufen]’ underwrites the most essential being of Dasein
itself. Anticipation represents the contemplation and revelation of Dasein to itself
(death) which instantiates its very potential and brings about a potentiality of
87 Ibid Heidegger, pg. 252
86 Camus, Albert, The Myth of Sisyphus. (London: Random House, 1942), pg. 24.
85 Ibid Heidegger, pg. 241
84 Seneca. Epistles, Volume III: Epistles 93-124. Translated by Richard M. Gummere. Loeb Classical Library 77.




Dasein. For Heidegger, it was this revelation which made authentic existence
possible. The issue with true immortality is that it infinitely expands a potentiality
of being-toward-some-thing other to death, namely eternal life, and simultaneously
purloins the possibility of the Dasein’s ownmost potentiality. The question of
whether Dasein, in death’s absence, as an existential and metaphysical constitution
remains as itself is urgent. My answer is no, it cannot. It is key to understand that
consciousness, for all three thinkers, reifies the potentiality of the human being.
Sartre writes “Potentiality is not mere possibility: it presents itself as something
which really exists, but its mode of existence is potency”88 Camus asked us to
embrace the potentiality of rebellion against our imprisonment in the absurd.
Heidegger urged one to comprehend this prison as oneself. True immortals
confront a different prison entirely, one that begets their existence—rather than
death which for them is impossible—as their own insuperable potentiality.
Assuming true immortals are as capable of cognition as human beings, we can rest
assured that each performs their respective anticipation. And yet, the direction of
one’s phenomenological thrust matters. Once again, the metaphysical constitution
of the two beings permits and solidifies a grotesque existential obscurity. 
Meaning and Projects
Meaning is not the same as goodness. It is, in my mind, a grave error to conflate the
perceived goodness of continued life with a life that imbibes meaning. The issues
that conceptions of meaning face up to with respect to true immortality is that of
transience, finitude, and subjectivity. These issues are significant when analyzing




the efficacy and performance of projects that are purportedly meaningful. I
discussed earlier the two assertions that can be said to be a priori constitutive of the
true immortal. The second assertion which emphasizes the lost quality of the
temporal relation to death is instructive. Let us recognize the value of transience to
our representations of meaningful projects. Human beings and true immortals are
largely capable of undertaking similar projects. Both can procreate and raise
children, write profound literature, travel the world and the like. But how does
time impact the meaningfulness of these activities? I consider here the arguments
of both Martha Nussbaum and Thomas Nagel, who, while demonstrating
diametrically opposed temporal adaptations of meaning, nevertheless illuminate
the integrity of meaning in relation to time and finitude. Nussbaum attaches moral
worth to temporally constrained projects when she writes: 
The intensity and dedication with which very many human activities are
pursued cannot be explained without reference to the awareness that our
opportunities are finite, that we cannot choose these activities indefinitely
many times. In raising a child, in cherishing a lover, in performing a
demanding task of work or thought or artistic creation, we are aware, at some
level, off the thought that each of these efforts is structured and constrained by
time.89
Here you witness the temporal structure of the moral value of human action.
Simply put, human beings attach extrinsic moral worth to things as well as
activities because they understand the essentiality of objective (the project or thing)
and subjective (personal) finitude. As an inadvertent critique on the moral worth of
true immortal projects Nagel claims: 
It is o en remarked that nothing we do now will matter in a million years. But
if that is true, then by the same token, nothing that will be the case in a million
89 Nussbaum, Martha. The Therapy of Desire. Theory and practice in Hellenistic ethics. (Princeton: Princeton




years matters now. In particular, it does not matter now that in a million years
nothing we do now will matter.90
It is inevitable that in a truly immortal world one will live through thousands and
eventually millions of years. Nagel reminds us to zoom out and entertain the
potential that human projects will not bear resonance at the opposite end of a vast
expanse of time. Presumably, the cosmic significance of even an intrinsically
valuable human life aged 110 years will be so minuscule as to be negligible.
Although a true immortal’s life can reach no completion and thus negates temporal
polarities, the evidence that imbued meaning in their projects will dissipate
remains strong. A true immortal life will continue to have meaning, but
throughout time their projects will not. Following Nagel, if a true immortal’s
project now has no meaning a million years from now, then the inverse claim
holds true as well. That is, at no finite temporal end within and around a grand
expanse of time will the true immortal’s project have eminent meaning. The
concept of a legacy, and the value architecture it rests upon is thrown into the
dustbin. Subjectivity, by definition, implies individuality. Of course, one could still
pursue projects that are enticing and this would qualify its intrinsic meaning.
However, I make the argument that the temporal component of meaning that I
suggest in reference to transience is universal. Time is the key agent in the extrinsic
conference of meaning onto an entity in a human world. Conversely, the
temporal lack in the true immortal realm is for the true immortal a universal
blockade. 
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The specters of boredom and existential bloat as functions of temporal
magnitude are equally dubious. Preston and Dixon91 point to the importance of
temporal limits in enduring a mortal life due to our being able to have novel
experiences. Human beings and true immortals alike can and eventually will
experience boredom. The latter faces a boredom which is perhaps incurable. True
immortal lives may be infinite but the array of experiences on a finite planet are
not. The true immortal runs the risk of doing everything they could ever wish to
do, and experiencing everything they may wish to experience. Even the
undertaking of certain projects would be contingent on one’s degree of economic
and social resources, which, as I pointed out earlier, are variable and potentially
skint. Squalid is the creature whose existence is bound to perpetual destitution.
Still, one’s life could be constantly pleasant. Indeed, a susceptibility to the boredom
argument is that certain experiences exist whose utility never diminishes. Activities
such a sex, eating good food, listening to fine music are repeatable, rather than
‘self-exhausting’ activities. These and other activities o en depend on our
conscious attitudes toward that activity which relies, in turn, on our memories of
that activity.
Let us argue, as Fischer has cleverly done, that in a truly immortal life, our
memories would fade over time and be reconstituted around the new experiences
which shape memories.92 Perhaps this would satisfy the problem of boredom
regarding both repeatable and self-exhausting activities but it would fail to satisfy
the conceptual requirement of desirable true immortality which stipulates that the
92 Ibid Fischer, pg. 122
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imagined immortal would still be me. We are largely our consciousnesses, both our
capacity to conceive of the world then code and recall it. Although, theoretically
speaking, true immortals could traverse the reality of boredom, they would
undergo psychological recreations periodically ad infinitum. Their potentiality,
unlike a human’s, would be meandering, would be of being-toward-no-thing. The
protagonist of Dostoevsky’s work repeatedly impugns his condition. He wishes
over and over to affirm his essence, to define himself positively but he cannot93 A
common feature of the existentialist canon was their almost religious faith in man’s
ability to be free, to choose. Be it the essence of one’s character or the very
continuation of one’s life. The Heideggerian schema involves an existence which
reveals itself to death at all times. The life of a true immortal is revealed only to
existence which lends itself to an endless succession of ephemeral essences:
being-towards-no-thing. Humankind cannot bear very much existence. The true
immortal, unfortunately, bears far too much. The underground man writhed in
indignation at his solitary fate, understanding that one cursed with the freedom to
become everything would become altogether nothing.
Conclusion: Immortality as Deprivation and Rejecting the
Impasse
A number of authors have rightly advanced the argument in response to the
Epicurean position that death is not bad for the person who dies. The deprivation
account, according to Benatar, is the idea that death is bad because it deprives an
individual of any future good that they would have otherwise had had they not




ceased living.94 Expanding this view, death can deprive one of other intrinsic goods.
For instance, death can deprive one of various desire-satisfactions. Certain projects
that one yearns to fulfill could be permanently and irreversibly snatched from
them. Moreover, what is clear about death is that it is the annihilation of one’s life
and so vanquishes a vessel of existence which is good in itself. Where any of these
deprivations fall on an individual’s scale of values is a subjective matter. Yet, to
posit such a scale is a determination of free consciousness. Freedom is the value
that shrouds value itself. Considering this, reversing the deprivation account to
shine light on immortality as tyranny is a laudable goal. Benatar concedes that one
may very well find themselves in a position where they judge their lives not worth
continuing. He condemns the moral constrain that is o en derived from
stigmatization surrounding suicide. He writes, “If suicide were impermissible…then
those people would be trapped….To deny people the moral freedom to kill
themselves is to deny them control over a decision of immense importance to
them.”95 Suicide in a truly immortal world would not be impermissible, it would be
impossible because death is impossible. True immortality is metaphysically
abundant but leaves its subjects devoid of the human being’s most possible
constitutive properties which is death and freedom over life. 
Appealing to Christopher Hitchens, Fischer elucidates the deprivation theory
with a metaphor of a party: 
It will happen to all of us, that at some point you get tapped on the shoulder
and told, not just that the party’s over, but slightly worse, that the party’s going
on—but you have to leave. And it’s going on without you.96
96 Ibid Fischer, pg. 40
95 Ibid, pg. 196




Deprivation wades through the deepest recesses of the human essence, it operates
between the full spectrum of human desire and being. True immortality is the
grandest party, to be sure. And I, as much as anybody, would be dejected if, while
jovial in song and dance, I were to be escorted out by a dark figure armed with a
scythe. However, this looming fate would seem sweet when compared to the
option of being told that I could not leave the party at all. True immortality is this
other fate. True immortality is telling one they can never leave the party. I may
even make the claim, aligning with my idea of the tripartite unity, that
categorically, true immortality is a net disadvantage. It offers the true immortal
only two metaphysical modes of being, prenatal nonexistence and existence but
obscures the metaphysical dimension of postmortem nonexistence a er death.
Once again, as a constitution, true immortals are vastly different to human beings. 
I reject the impasse. I am because I will one day no longer be. The purpose of
this critique consists in the attempt to discern the metaphysical and existential
constituencies between both the human being and the true immortal, thereby
demonstrating that both creatures are ontologically irreconcilable. The
physiological hue of the true immortal forms the two a priori assertions I made in
the introduction that underlie the tyrannies it cannot escape and furthermore,
corroborates an index of impossibilities and privations. The border analogy is
pertinent to comprehending why certain facts about the human being cannot be
changed lest we risk serious permutations. I have shown that death underscores the
quintessential facts of being for humankind. A particular ontic existence that
includes freedom, a richness of meaning, an acuity for death, authenticity, and




alterations to the physical nature of the human being while adjuring still to the
metaphysical aspects of that creature that make up its identity, namely, death and
freedom. For true immortality to be desirable, it would have to comply with the
parameters of human potentiality. It fails in this mission. It dissolves our borders and
creates its own. The fate of the true immortal never belongs to him. Rather
something else begets his existence, an eternity foisted upon him, strange and
inhuman. An endless day; a sun without shadow. The torpor of one whose reality is
shaped by his very bondage to existence. As Franz Ka a once correctly remarked,
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The Provincializing Power of Mahāyāna Buddhism
Ryan Curnow
Abstract
Alongside the physical, concrete history of colonialism, there is always the
perniciously pervasive self-absolutizing philosophy which supports this
colonialism. Likewise, just as there have always been resistors against the physical
oppression of colonialism, there are both critiques and the potential for critique of
colonialist philosophy around the world. This essay seeks to demonstrate how
colonial epistemology and its deeply harmful effects may be challenged not only
by the thought of modern-day academic thinkers influenced by current trends in
postcolonial and decolonial theory, but just as well by the original philosophies of
colonized peoples. Combining Dipesh Chakrabarty’s astute postcolonial analysis
with the principles of Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy, I aim to display the inherent
potential that this prominent sect of Buddhism contains with regards to refuting
epistemic colonialism. To this end, I discuss the nature of Chakrabarty’s critique of
European historicism, the distinct philosophical approaches of the Mahāyāna sect’s
two most preeminent schools, and how these schools stand alongside





Through the work of the contemporary postcolonial thinker Dipesh Chakrabarty,
we may see that the modern history of Europe’s relation to the cultures it has
subjugated has been one of epistemic absolutism and developmental demarcation.
Among countless colonized peoples, local ways of life and worldviews have been
subjected to the strict assessment of a specific European philosophical standard
and, in no small part resulting from imposed colonial categories of inferiority, such
practices have been denigrated and the peoples disenfranchised. One non-Western
intellectual tradition which has been subject to this asymmetrically historicist
dogma is the philosophy of Buddhism, as demonstrated by many scholars, such as
the example of G. W. F. Hegel’s dismissal of  it as a premature stage in his
envisioned world system of religious development hierarchically culminating in
Western Christianity. However, it is through Buddhist thought that one may find
one of the strongest critiques of such narrow philosophical outlooks. The
European judgement, as described above, indeed must be understood as
absolutizing—in its ‘vantage from nowhere’ atemporal stance, it sweeps under the
rug a problematic epistemology which I take Buddhism to be fit to challenge. In
challenging this view, Buddhism shows its potential for a decolonizing ethics which
thereby combats the violence caused by Europe’s attempt at self-universalization.
Along the lines of Chakrabarty’s project of provincializing Europe’s belief in its




schools of Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy, there is the potential for a robust
non-dualist critique of European colonial historicism and epistemic absolutism.
Universalist Historicism and Chakrabarty’s Critique
The problematic nature of European historicism, as described and analyzed by
Chakrabarty, is defined by its tendency to place other social or cultural groups in a
rigidly ranked, linear hierarchy of temporalities in which the dominant group sits
at the top. Within the historical—and in certain ways still present—paradigm of
European modernist ideology, this most simply manifests itself in the mentality
which states, “first in Europe, then elsewhere.” Chakrabarty explains this mentality
further as follows, “Historicism is what made modernity or capitalism look not
simply global but rather as something that became global over time, by originating
in one place (Europe) and then spreading outside it.”97 From within the broadly
European intellectual framework, or at least from the frameworks which had been
most virtually prominent on the continent such as modernism and capitalist
ideology, the colonial mindset promotes the assimilation of non-European cultures
with non-European intellectual systems into their specific conception of history.
The “global” nature of the European conception is asserted through an idea of
universal progression. With the notion of universal progression comes the idea of
an inequality in development towards the same ideal throughout different cultures.
This is epitomized by John Stuart Mill’s assessment of non-Western peoples in
Africa and India regarding the question of self-government: “According to Mill,
97 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton:




Indians or Africans were not yet civilized enough to rule themselves. Some
historical time of development and civilization (colonial rule and education, to be
precise) had to elapse before they could be considered prepared for such a task.”98
Hence, for this epistemologically colonialist worldview, European standards
became a goal for all non-European peoples to ascend towards hierarchically. In
this way, even benevolent intentions towards colonized peoples can retain a
supremacist and inegalitarian view towards differing cultural worldviews and
practices.
The philosophical problem at the core of this colonial homogenization of
world history is constituted by a disjointed view of time and a dichotomously
objectifying view of different cultures, in which Europe deems itself the prime
subject of history, relegating the rest of the world to the position of its objects.
Firstly, inherent within the European separation and hierarchical-ization of
peoples into different levels of progress towards European cultural standards is the
act of displacing such peoples into entirely separate temporalities. Chakrabarty
expresses it in this manner, “The inhabitants of the colonies, on the other hand,
were assigned a place ‘elsewhere’ in the ‘first in Europe and then elsewhere’
structure of time. This move of historicism is what Johannes Fabian has called ‘the
denial of coevalness.’”99 By viewing the non-European colonized groups as, in a
sense, behind Europe in the straight line of progression, as if these non-European
peoples resembled Europeans in previous epochs of development, the historicist
outlook treats the “underdeveloped” groups as though they inhabit their own
99 Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe, 8.




separate spheres of time and place. This is what is meant by the “denial of
coevalness,” in that the historicist neglects the reality that those who they view as
underdeveloped actually inhabit the exact same time and (global) place as
them—in other words, there is always contemporaneity between peoples.
Moreover, this treatment of foreign, colonized cultures by those who inherit
the European colonialist mindset is an expression of  a particularly dehumanizing
relationship. On that note, Chakrabarty says this in particular regarding the typical
historicist view of the supernaturalist practices of certain colonized peoples:
Depending on the political dispositions of their authors, historicist
narratives by secular and rational scholars have produced either harshly
judgmental or sympathetic accounts of subaltern social groups’ tendency to
treat gods, spirits, and other supernatural entities as agential beings in the
worlds of humans. But, sympathetic or not, these accounts all foreground a
separation—a subject-object distinction—between the academic
observer-subject and the “superstitious” persons serving as the objects of
study.100
Not only are the colonized set apart in such a way as to make them seem as if they
inhabited an entirely different temporality, they are also analyzed as though they
were mere pieces of evidence or objects from another time. Even if the colonizer
has the intent to liberate the colonized people, if this value of liberation comes
from a historicist position in which the colonized must catch up in terms of
progress, then this is an objectifying view: “It is through such
objectification—predicated on the principle of anachronism—that the eye of the
participant is converted into the eye of the witness.”101 It is explicitly in this manner
that the nature of historicist observation, treating other human cultures as though
they were pieces of archaeological evidence to be analyzed, is connected to the
101 Ibid, 239.




denial of coevalness—through the act of witnessing as opposed to simply being a
fellow member of one and the same time and space. What is common to these
one-sided views of European colonial epistemology is the absolutizing of itself
within time whilst relativizing all other times in relation to its own. Through his
addressing of these colonialist outlooks, Chakrabarty seeks to subject Europe to the
same 'provincialization' that it reserves for the rest of the world, thereby
de-reifying its absolutist epistemological self-understanding. A relevant example of
an epistemology that successfully provincializes Europe while avoiding the urge to
declare itself the end of history can be found in the different metaphysical
approaches of Mahāyāna Buddhist thought.
Madhyamaka Emptiness and the Reassertion of Coevalness
Through an analysis of space and time as necessarily interdependent, as provided
by the Madhyamaka school of Mahāyāna Buddhism, one may begin to
philosophically critique the absurdity of the colonialist denial of coevalness. The
Madhyamaka school, founded by the saint Nāgārjuna, is predicated on a
philosophical interpretation of the core messages of Buddhism on the basis of
“emptiness.” When something is referred to as “empty” within the Madhyamaka
system of thought, it is deemed as lacking in inherent, or self-subsisting existence.
Nāgārjuna applies this critical analysis not just to observable entities but to all
possible objects and subjects, as all things are interdependent in some causal or
conceptual manner.102 Hence, the aim of this philosophy is to show that there can





be no such thing which can be tenably referred to as metaphysically independent;
by the very fact of existing, something must be completely relationally dependent
upon other phenomena. Furthermore, Nāgārjuna totalizes the nature of this
emptiness by adding that objects cannot even have an inherent existence through
dependence on other phenomena: “If there is no essence, there can be no
otherness-essence.”103 As there is no thing which, by its own power, can be said to
exist, there is no possibility for anything else to inherently exist by depending on
phenomena which only purportedly already do. It is through this analysis that
Nāgārjuna is able to assert the “empty”-ness of all things. Already, one may see how
such a view of interconnectivity may serve as a critique of views which seek to
posit separate temporalities. For if something is said to exist in any way, then it
must bear some connection to the rest of perceivable or conceivable existence; this
is another way of saying that, if something were said to be, somehow,
metaphysically independent of all other things, then it would not be able to be
conceived or perceived in any possible way. From this view alone, the
Madhyamaka school is able to criticize the historicist treatment of the colonized as
intellectually untenable, given its doctrine of separate time-spaces leading up to
one supposedly ultimate end.
Just as well, through the logic of Madhyamaka, the total relationality of all
conceptions of time shows that any notion of multiple, disparate times is
indefensible. Nāgārjuna criticizes the idea of an independent time in this manner,
“If they [the present and the future] are not dependent upon the past, neither of
103 Nāgārjuna, The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, trans. Jay L.




the two would be established. Therefore neither the present nor the future would
exist.”104 If there is no sense in which the present moment, or in fact the future as it
can be thought of, depends upon what is prior, then once again there is no way to
ground such ideas. Thus, Nāgārjuna says, “A nonstatic time is not grasped. Nothing
one could grasp as stationary time exists. If time is not grasped, how is it known?”105
This question directly challenges the denial of coevalness enacted by the colonial
historicist mindset. Time can only be conceived of in terms of relations we find in
one interconnected reality. There can be no discussion of some “other time” or an
“elsewhere.” The Madhyamaka perspective logically demands that one view all
temporal relations as contemporaneous. This confronts the historicist and
demands that they recognize the “primitive” culture as existing in their own time,
in their own plane of existence, just as much as any other human subjects. Hence,
at least as one school of Mahāyāna Buddhism, the Madhyamaka doctrine shows
how the metaphysical tendency inherent within historicism to temporally displace
other human cultures is a fundamentally illogical view. Coevalness is necessarily
maintained thereby.
Yogācāra Subject-Object Dissolution as the Rejection of
Objectification
On the other hand, the Yogācāra sect of Mahāyāna thought may serve as a
particularly apt critique of the objectification of the observed through its
philosophy of subject-object dissolution. Distinct from the Madhyamaka school,
105 Ibid.




the Yogācāra are more intent on proving the “emptiness” of phenomena through
the dependence of all external entities upon consciousness. The foundation of this
idealism is summarized well by one of the school’s founders, Vasubandhu, in this
verse,
In Mahayana philosophy . . . , [reality is] viewed as being consciousness-only
. . . . Mind (citta), thought (manas), consciousness (chit), and perception
(pratyaksa) are synonyms. The word "mind" (citta) includes mental states and
mental activities in its meaning. The word "only" is intended to deny the
existence of any external objects of consciousness. We recognize, of course,
that "mental representations seem to be correlated with external
(non-mental) objects; but this may be no different from situations in which
people with vision disorders 'see' hairs, moons, and other things that are 'not
there.'"106
Through the unity found in the nature of mental representations, the Yogācāra
school asserts the dependency of all external phenomena. Vasubandhu argues that,
regardless of how much it may seem as though there is an external thing which our
perceptions only correspond to, this does not alter the fact that all perceptions are
nothing but representations; any attempt to find a true, inherent phenomenon
would only be met with more representations, due to the fact that one is still
merely perceiving. By virtue of always being perceived, the object of perception
being an object of consciousness, there can be no tenable positing of things totally
external to the mind.
The dissolution of the dichotomous notions of subject and object follow
from this Yogācāra idealism. A er all, the consciousness of “consciousness-only” is
not the mere individual consciousness of a self, but what is described as the
alaya-vijñana, or the “store consciousness.” It is from this universal form of





consciousness from which all forms of perception or phenomena arise from
different streams or “seeds.”107 Hence, Vasubandhu says, “Both subjectivity (atman)
and objectivity (dharma) arise from the unconscious (the alaya-vijñana = the
domain of 'seed-consciousness'). Perception [for example, vision] arises from a
seed [in the unconscious] and gives rise to an apparent object [for example, color] .
. . .”108 Vasubandhu then explicates this view further in this next passage,
The six levels of perception are only representations (appearances) of
consciousness that arise out of the unconscious (the alaya-vijñana). Once a
disciple, through his study of the Dharma [the teachings of the Buddha],
realizes that there is, in fact, no seer, no hearer, no smeller, no taster, no
toucher, and no thinker, he will enter into an understanding of the
insubstantiality of self. And when he learns that the objects of perception are
also representations (appearances) of consciousness-only, and that there are,
in fact, no experienced entities that have the characteristics of external
objectivity, then the disciple will enter into an understanding of the
insubstantiality of [experienced] objects.109
Given that even perceptions of the self are themselves representations of what are
merely the germinating seeds of the universal store consciousness, there is neither
a subject as typically conceived nor are there external objects to be perceived by
the self. In this way, to speak of any dichotomy between a subject and an object is
untenable. Rather, there is only the stream of the single, ineffable consciousness.
This assertion of subject-object unity is relevant to critiquing colonial
epistemology in the same way that the notion of emptiness is, as it is a specific
subject’s (in this case, a culture’s) self-universalization and consequent
coevalness-denial that suggests their dichotomous separation.
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Through the dissolution of subject and object, Yogācāra Buddhism provides
an essential basis for the critique of the objectification of colonized peoples done
through historicist observation. For, when the ideas of singular selves and objects
which can exist externally independent of those selves are done away with, any
notion of observing another person as a mere object, a piece of evidence from
“elsewhere” to be analyzed, becomes logically indefensible. Like with the
relationality of time, the dissolution of subject and object, and thus the dissolution
of objectification, compels a perspective of all sides as contemporaneous.
Chakrabarty remarks on the nature of this in the following passage, “This gesture is
akin to the one Kierkegaard developed in critiquing explanations that looked on
the Biblical story of Abraham’s sacrifice of his son Isaac either as deserving an
historical or psychological explanation or as a metaphor or allegory, but never as a
possibility for life open today to one who had faith. ‘[W]hy bother to remember a
past,’ asked Kierkegaard, ‘that cannot be made into a present?’”110 Through the
dissolution of subject and object, human beings from different groups, including
colonizer and colonized, can come to see the experiences of their Other as
positively influential upon themselves rather than primitively detached and merely
“behind”. Instead of viewing what were once regarded as “primitive” practices as
merely superstitious supernaturalism, one can see how these practices may actually
carry truth and weight in a sense that is just as meaningful as one’s own ideas of
rationality.
The Mahāyāna Defense of Cultural Plurality




In fact, on this note, both the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra schools provide a way in
which different, perhaps supernaturalist ways of being-in-the-world which are
usually incommensurable with Western rationality may in fact be logically
legitimized. The Madhyamaka philosophy agrees with Yogācāra in their view of
the formation of phenomena as dependent upon conceptual fabrications, which
are constructions of consciousness.111 Hence, although they differ in multiple
nuanced ways, both schools deny the possibility of there being an ontologically
independent state of the external world. As articulated by Eviatar Shulman,
The world, we may say, is similar to an illusion. It is not totally an illusion,
but is similar to one, in the sense that it lacks any truly objective aspects, or
at least that these are minimized and marginalized to such a degree that they
can never be fully independently real. The world may be external, but it is
not categorically, qualitatively, and ontologically distinct from
consciousness. This is what Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu most clearly agree
on—that the world is a type of illusion, dream, or fantasy.112
With this in mind, this means that different non-Western forms of reason which
are usually deemed as irrational due to their supposed lack of objectivity, or lack of
correspondence with some external matter of fact, may actually be seen as just as
meaningful as other conventional ways of looking at things. Given that everything
perceived is a representation in the sense that what is perceived is dependent upon
the unpredictable fluctuations of consciousness and how our dispositions arise,
endure, and fall in response to those fluctuations, non-Western forms of
perception which were once insulted and set aside as mere fantasy can now be
legitimized as such. It is not because of the absurd possibility that suddenly all
fiction is fact that these viewpoints may be legitimized, but from the fact that all
112 Eviatar Shulman, “Nāgārjuna the Yogācārin? Vasubandhu the Mādhyamaka?: On the Middle-Way Between
Realism and Antirealism,” in Madhyamaka and Yogācāra: Allies or Rivals?, ed. Jan Westerhoff and Jay L. Garfield,
184-212, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 209.




perceptions which are held to be true in some fashion are themselves
representations of a conventional sort (illusion-like, as Shulman suggests), and thus
stand on the same substratum or ground. Hence, different ways of experiencing
and being-in-the-world need not suffer such a dehumanizing attack from the
colonial epistemology of Western rationality—when all things are empty, either in
relation to each other or upon an indiscriminately universal idea of mind, there
can be no rational allowance of such absolutization.
Conclusion
Through the Madhyamaka rejection of coevalness-denial and the Yogācāra
rejection of subject-object dualism as both being metaphysically incoherent,
Mahāyāna Buddhism offers a provincializing force towards absolutist European
epistemology and any other reifying outlooks like it. In accordance with
Madhyamaka philosophy, no epistemology of a certain province has the logical
right to assert itself as temporally above and beyond others, since time cannot be
segmented into different static entities—rather, it is an interdependent whole. In
like manner, the Yogācāra school challenges the mindset that other groups may be
seen as objects to be merely studied as such based on the reality that the notion of
object is actually inextricably linked to the subject and the fabrications of
consciousness; how can one be justified in detaching the so-called object from
oneself when it is ultimately not detached or disconnected at all? It is in these ways
that the truths of Mahāyāna philosophy eliminate the assumptions of




and cultures. However, the aim of this essay is not just to demonstrate how one of
many world philosophies may use its logic to challenge others, but to show how a
philosophy of a colonized people may play a vital decolonizing role As so much
violence done towards colonized peoples is attributable to the colonial epistemic
worldview, a philosophy capable of critiquing this view serves not only a logical
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